You may seek judicial review of this decision by filing a petition for review in the appropriate court, as specified in Wis. Stat. section 227.53(1)(a), within 30 days of the mailing of this order.

The petition must name as party respondent "The Board of Regents of the University of Wisconsin System."

Universities: Madison, Milwaukee, Eau Claire, Green Bay, La Crosse, Oshkosh, Parkside, Platteville, River Falls, Stevens Point, Stout, Superior, Whitewater,

Colleges: Baraboo/Sauk County, Barron County, Fond du Lac, Fox Valley, Manitowoc, Marathon County, Marinette, Marshfield/Wood County, Richland,

BOARD OF REGENTS OF THE UNIVERSITY OF WISCONSIN SYSTEM

AFFIDAVIT OF MAILING

JESS LATHROP, Executive Director and Corporate Secretary of the Board of Regents of the University of Wisconsin System, swears or affirms that:

On June 8, 2018, I placed in the United States Mail a cover letter, a copy of the affidavit of mailing showing the date of mailing, and the Decision and Order in the matter of the recommended dismissal of Dr. Sabina Burton, a tenured faculty member at UW-Platteville, to:

BOARD OF REGENTS OF THE UNIVERSITY OF WISCONSIN SYSTEM

IN THE MATTER OF THE RECOMMENDED DISMISSAL OF ASSOCIATE PROFESSOR, DR. SABNA BURTON, A TENURED FACULTY MEMBER AT UW-PLATTEVILLE

DECISION AND ORDER

PARTIES

Associate Professor Dr. Sabina Burton, 5768 Maple Glen Lane, Platteville, WI 53818.

Chancellor Dennis Shields, University of Wisconsin-Platteville, represented by Deputy General

Counsel Jennifer Lattis, Office of General Counsel, 1220 Linden Drive, Madison, WI 53706.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

This matter is before the Board of Regents of the University of Wisconsin System (Board of Regents) upon the recommendations of Chancellor Dennis Shields and the UW-Platteville Faculty Hearing Panel that Dr. Sabina Burton, tenured associate professor in the Department of Criminal Justice, be dismissed from her position.

Any person having a tenured appointment may be dismissed only for just cause and only after due notice and hearing. See Regent Policy Document 20-23; see also Wis. Admin. Code

UWS 4.01. The decision of the Board of Regents with respect to such matters is final, subject only to judicial review under Wis. Stat. ch. 227.

<< According to 227.53(1)(a)2 its “within 30 days after the service of the decision of the agency upon all parties under s. 227.48. We were served on June 8. ” Sabina should have the right to file a petition for a re-hearing within 20 days. 227.49(1) More about this in :(JudicialReview) The Board failed to include it as a right so they are probably in violation of 227.48(2) “Each decision shall include notice of any right of the parties to petition for rehearing and administrative or judicial review of adverse decisions, the time allowed for filing each petition and identification of the party to be named as respondent.” Dr. Burton elects not to pursue this because the administration will just set up another kangaroo court and harass her more. The outcome will be the same and we will have wasted time. The only relief possible is for the court to recognize the corruption in the System and to address it.

On 6-16-18 – Roger Burton sent an email to Lathrop cc Lattis asking in the Board’s interpretation of law, whether Sabina was due a right to petition for a re-hearing. (Roger-asksaboutRehearing-6-16-18). Wade Harrison responded saying “You have asked whether Dr. Burton has a right under Wis. Stat. 227.49 to seek reconsideration of the decision of the Board of Regents. In our opinion, she does not. The Wisconsin Supreme Court has held that chapter 227 contested case provisions, of which 227.49 is one, do not apply to University of Wisconsin faculty termination cases. See Marder v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Wisconsin Sys., 2005 WI 159, ¶ 24, 286 Wis. 2d 252, 268–69, 706 N.W.2d 110, 119.. Please note that the Board’s decision is final and it will not be responding to further requests from Dr. Burton.” ” (Harrison-denies-requests). Supreme court decision: (SupremeCt-Marder-11-29-05).

Harrison’s response is wrong. They seem to love pointing to the Marder case to cover all their misdeeds. However, the Marder case does not support his argument. The supreme court decision in the Marder case states “Marder does not assert that there was insufficient evidence presented to the Board to terminate him for just cause. Instead, he argues that: (1) the Board failed to accord him a fair hearing under the contested case procedures of ch. 227, which prohibits ex parte communications with the decision-maker on the merits of the case and provides specific remedies when such communication occurs.” So, Harrison’s argument fails first, because Burton has not contested that the Board failed to accord her a fair hearing under ch. 227, she argues that they failed to provide her a fair hearing under UWS 4; that they also used inapplicable UWP procedures; that there was insufficient credible evidence to terminate her for just cause and that after the Board terminated Burton it violated ch. 227 by failing to inform her of her right under that statute to petition for a re-hearing and by misinterpreting the law so as to deny her the opportunity to do so.

The court wrote: “The court of appeals concluded that ch. 227 contested case provisions did not apply to Marder's case.” Marder claimed an ex-parte communication violation occurred immediately before the Board’s decision to fire him. However, in Sabina’s case, the Board’s violations occurred after the decision to terminate Sabina. The Marder decision repeatedly expressly opines that ch. 227 does not apply to “pre-termination” procedure. So, when does it begin to apply? The answer is simple and obvious. Ch. 227 applies for post-termination procedures. Burton asked Harrison for the report and he refused. So, the Board violated 227.25(5) after their decision to dismiss Burton. IMPORTANT It might be good for Sabina’s attorneys to ask for the original again. Get it in writing after the state judicial review appeal has been filed.

The Supreme court also wrote that the court of appeals “held that the applicable administrative code provisions, § UWS 4, and Marder's constitutional due process rights required Marder's presence at any hearing in which new facts were presented on which his discharge was based” (emphasis added). So, the Board has shot itself in the foot again. We can use the Board’s own pet court decision, Marder, to show that Sabina’s constitutional right to be present at the hearing of 5-25-17 was violated because she was not able, through no fault of her own, to be in attendance of the hearing. New facts were presented at that hearing and those facts were relied on by the Board. - Important.

The court wrote “We conclude that the proper pre-termination procedure for a tenured faculty member of the University of Wisconsin System is set out in Wis. Stat. § 36.13 and Wis. Admin. Code § UWS 4, which the Board correctly employed.” There are three important points associated with this statement:

1) Burton asked for the original Roter report after she had been terminated (Defense record submitted to court on 8-27-18 - 577387 pg 17). Her request was denied in violation of ch. 227.45(5). IMPORTANT - Wis. Stat. 227.55(1) states that the record shall include ““the original or a certified copy of the entire record,” We should argue that Roter is the only person who can certify the Roter report as the original.

2) The Board did not correctly employ UWS 4 in Sabina’s case. In fact, they also used UW Platteville procedures, another violation of law and policy.

3) UWS 4.05(h) states “A fair hearing for a faculty member whose dismissal is sought under s. UWS 4.01 shall include…Admissibility of evidence governed by s. 227.45 (1) to (4), Stats.” So, those parts of section 227 do apply to pre-termination hearings.

Marder was accused of very serious violations of law and policy. But Burton was accused of violating an unwritten “standard of trust” that she didn’t even know about. The Marder case is not applicable in this way.

Hearing Panel failed to properly advertise the hearings in violation of Wisconsin Open Meetings Law:

The improperly formed hearing panel failed to notice the official newspaper of the hearings. Wis. Stat. 19.97(3) says any action taken at an improper meeting is voidable. It would be hard to argue that the public interest in enforcing the statutes is outweighed by the public interest in sustaining the action taken. There is no “public interest” in dismissing faculty members for being allegedly “uncollegial”, as compared with the interest in transparency of such proceedings, especially when those proceedings expose cover-ups and public misconduct. This is IMPORTANT

On December 16, 2016, Interim Provost Elizabeth Throop (Throop previously served as Dean) and Interim Dean Melissa E. Gormley filed a complaint pursuant to Wisconsin Administrative Code s. UWS 4.02(1) seeking the termination of Dr. Burton from her position as a tenured professor in the Department of Criminal Justice because of ongoing harassing and bullying behavior. This complaint followed a long series of events during which time both Throop and Chancellor Shields had issued letters of direction to Dr. Burton following extensive counseling.

<< The record does not support the allegation that there was any counseling. Dr. Strobl said in the hearing of 5-25-17 that she was instructed not to talk to Dr. Burton (Hearing-5-25-17-Rebuttal). 7777 Dr. Dalecki made a similar statement in an email in fall of 2014 (635 - meeting denied - Dalecki - 10-8-14).7777 There is evidence that the university cancelled mediation between Dr. Burton and Dr. Dalecki (EZZZU - Durr-Caywood Refused to meet) .7777 There is evidence that Dr. Caywood refused to mediate with Dr. Burton (exhibit EZZZU) 7777 Chancellor Shields refused to meet with Dr. Burton when she asked to discuss his 2013 grievance decision in Aug. 2013 (EZZZZZJ-1 - Meeting rqst - Chancellor)7777 and when she tried to schedule an appointment with him in Nov. 2016 after he invited her to meet (MtgRqst-11-9-16-ignored).7777 Both times Shields ignored Dr. Burton.

(Shields-LOD-6-3-16) , Chancellor-8-31-16-letter , (Shields-response-9-6-16 ). 7777 There is no evidence that the issuance of the letters of direction were accompanied by counselling. They were not. Quite the contrary. In Spring 2010, and in Aug. 2014 the Chancellor’s office mandated communications training to the entire CJ Department but failed to follow through even after Dr. Burton brought it up repeatedly to HR asking for the training addressing the severe dysfunction in the CJ Dept. Dkt 46-132. 7777 >>

Chancellor Shields concluded that the charges were substantial, and if true, could lead to dismissal. Following an investigation, Chancellor Shields issued a statement of charges proposing dismissal.

<< Chancellor Shields based his decision entirely on the investigation report and the Throop/Gormley complaint ( hearing of 9-19-17). However, the investigative Roter report failed to name Burton as the sole source of the dysfunction in the CJ Department. The report stated that the department members did not feel physically threatened by Dr. Burton. An email from Stackman to Throop indicates that she feared retaliation from people in the department other than Burton (Re_Chair Recommendation-Stackman-2-11-15) 7777

The investigation was discriminatory as the investigator spoke to only a small number of department members that Burton previously filed complaints against. There are many problems with Chancellor Shields’ statement of charges (see Rebuttal to Chancellor Shields’ Statement of Charges ).7777

Shields never talked to Roter about her report (Transcript-hearing-9-19-17 – pg 71 ln 25 – pg 72 ln 4) 7777 Shields changed accounts in the report. I.e. he stated that Burton had talked about her case in class but nothing was written about this in the Roter report or in the Throop/Gormley complaint. Shields also misrepresented Burton’s comments to Roter about her communication style.

In accordance with the provisions of UWS Chapter 4 and the implementing policies of UW-Platteville, a full evidentiary hearing on the charges was held before a faculty hearing panel on May 25, 2017, September 19, 2017, and November 30, 2017.

Burton was not able to attend the hearing on 5-25-17 due to severe illness. The administration conducted the hearing in spite of Burton’s absence. This violated her constitutional rights as well as UWS 4. (see Marder supreme court decision)

The hearing was not “full” it was truncated to exclude material evidence.. A full evidentiary hearing should review all charges and allow the appellant to defend herself against each and every one of them if so requested. A full evidentiary hearing requires that all evidence and all witnesses are available for cross-examination. That was not provided.

The UW Platteville procedures were used in the process. This violates UW Platteville procedures and it violates UWS 4. Burton was told erroneously, that the hearing was to be conducted per UWP policy. It was not.

UWS 4.01 (2): A faculty member is entitled to enjoy and exercise all the rights and privileges of a United States citizen, and the rights and privileges of academic freedom as they are generally understood in the academic community. Dr. Burton’s rights and privileges of academic freedom and her First Amendment rights were repeatedly, wantonly and maliciously violated.

UWS 4.015 (1) “Clear and convincing evidence" means information that would persuade a reasonable person to have a firm belief that a proposition is more likely true than not true. The panel was not informed what “clear and convincing” meant. The Board based their decision on a “preponderance of the evidence.” This is not the same standard used by the hearing panel. There was confusion about what the standard was. There was confusion about what the standard of just cause is. The Chancellor and Attorney Lattis mis-stated the standard of just cause to the hearing panel.

(4) “Consult" or “consulting" means thoroughly reviewing and discussing the relevant facts and discretionary issues. It is impossible for a panel to conduct their discussion in accordance with UWS 4 by omitting the appellant to speak to all charges and to cross-examine the witnesses and evidence against her. From the very beginning the appeal’s panel set artificially imposed stringent time limits on the appellant, going as far as interrupting the appellant’s testimony and withholding witnesses. The panel deliberated for one day, concerning matters that comprised six years and for which Burton provided thousands of pages of evidence and rebuttals.

UWS 4.02 (2) Any formal statement of specific charges for dismissal sent to a faculty member shall be accompanied by a statement of the appeal procedures available to the faculty member. This is a ministerial duty. This did not happen. The wrong procedures were given to her. Fake procedures were used against her. Fake procedures were issued to her.

Chancellor Shields withheld the appeal procedures from the appellant. It was first pointed out to him through appellant’s attorney Kara Amouyal on April 19, 2017. Then, on May 15, 17 Atty Amouyal informed the hearing panel of the Chancellor’s failure to provide the procedures (UWP state court exhibit filename: 577398 – page 20). . Shields’ attorney Lattis stated in her reply that there were no other appeal procedures other than the sentence that appellant had 20 days to file an appeal to the faculty senate (which was the wrong recipient). She stated so again in her email to the faculty senate chair Anderson. At the 9/19/2017 hearing Lattis admitted that the appeal procedures were not given to the appellant when due and called the omission “a harmless error.” She changed her story. It wasn’t a harmless error. It was a deliberate attempt to confuse Burton to force her into sending her appeal request to the wrong person. It worked. The court must reverse the Board’s decision because Chancellor Shields had a ministerial duty to provide Burton with the appeal procedures available to her and he failed to do so. IMPORTANT.

UWS 4.03 requires that the appeal panel “prepare a summary of the evidence and transmit such record and summary along with its recommended findings of law and decision to the board …” This did not happen. The panel omitted critical evidence submitted by appellant in her defense.

· UWS 4.04 requires that a hearing be held within 20 days. Burton wrote in her appeal request “I would like to remind you that UWS 4.04 requires that a hearing be held not later than 20 days after the request, which I submitted yesterday. By my calculation that makes the deadline for the hearing May 9, 2017” (UWP state court exhibit filename: 577398 – page 18). The hearing was not held within 20 days and no notice was given extending the time. There was no reason for the delay. This violated UWS 4. Burton did not make any request for extension past the 20 days. This is a material error of law. (Weyenberg v. UW-Oshkosh, makes clear that such rules are enforceable as statutes. That, combined with UWS 2.02, appears to make them law, and as such, intentional failure to comply with those laws constitutes “misconduct in public office” and a violation of Wis. Stats. 946.12.) Failure of the administration to hear Burton’s appeal within 20 days is a violation of due process law. IMPORTANT

UWS 4.05 provides appellant with adequate due process. Adequate due process includes “a right to be heard in her defense.” This did not happen. Appellant was not given time to respond to the charges and to the underlying letters of direction.

Adequate due process includes “a right to confront and cross-examine adverse witnesses.” Lattis and the panel chair did not allow for adequate time or opportunity to conduct cross-examinations of witnesses. IMPORTANT

Dr. Petra Roter, the investigator and author of the report that formed the basis for Chancellor Shields dismissal recommendation was not made available for testimony despite Burton’s repeated requests (Kasieta-to-Hansen-10-20-17-RE-Roter).7777

(1) 227.45 (1) says “The agency or hearing examiner shall admit all testimony having reasonable probative value,” (emphasis added) not just all that can fit in a proscribed time limit; unlimited by time for relevant testimony. IMPORTANT

Hearing panel allowed testimony wildly outside the scope of the charges, testimony that was immaterial, irrelevant.

(2) 227.45 (2) says “All evidence, including records and documents in the possession of the agency or hearing examiner of which the agency or hearing examiner desires to avail himself or herself, shall be duly offered and made a part of the record in the case. Every party shall be afforded adequate opportunity to rebut or offer countervailing evidence.” The record of the case did not contain appellant’s important rebuttals to the letter of direction and the charges as well as other important documents. While the hearing panel did not lay out a time frame to the charging party, they arbitrarily constrained the time the appellant had to defend herself against the charges as well as a magnitude of additional allegations outside of the scope of charges. Appellant was forced to decide if she wanted to cross-examine or testify as the panel did not provide adequate time for doing both. Further, attorney to the charging party hid an important piece of evidence, a grievance by Dr. Solar, that formed the basis for the complaint to the chancellor. Appellant had to involve the AG office to receive the hidden grievance on the day of the last hearing. Lattis prohibited appellant from addressing the hidden grievance at the hearing (SolarMemo-emailtoKilpatrick). . The hearing panel did not allow appellant another hearing to address the grievance. Burton was not afforded an adjournment due to valid claim of surprise as required. The opportunity afforded to Burton to rebut or offer countervailing evidence was completely inadequate. By failing to afford adequate opportunity the administration violated this applicable statute. Burton requested adequate time on numerous occasions but her requests were ignored.

(3) 227.45(3) says: ”An agency or hearing examiner may take official notice of any generally recognized fact or any established technical or scientific fact; but parties shall be notified either before or during the hearing or by full reference in preliminary reports or otherwise, of the facts so noticed, and they shall be afforded an opportunity to contest the validity of the official notice.” Appellant contested the validity of the investigative report, aka the Roter report and provided hearing panel with evidence that questioned the authenticity of the report yet appellant was not afforded the opportunity to question the alleged author of the report, Dr. Petra Roter.

(4) 227.45(4) says: ”An agency or hearing examiner shall take official notice of all rules which have been published in the Wisconsin administrative code or register.”

The hearing examiner did not observe WI Open Meetings law. They also violated many other rules.

(5) 227.45(5) says: “Documentary evidence may be received in the form of copies or excerpts, if the original is not readily available. Upon request, parties shall be given an opportunity to compare the copy with the original.” IMPORTANT

This paragraph does not apply to UWS 4 proceedings until after the appellant has been termination. This paragraph does apply to post-termination proceedings. Appellant requested on multiple occasions, including post-termination, to compare the copy of the Roter Report in the record, with the original. The request was denied every time.

The Faculty Panel issued its decision on the matter on December 14, 2017, recommending Burton's dismissal for just cause.

Raymond Cross recommending the dismissal of Dr. Burton. President Cross referred the matter to the Board of Regents. Regent President John Behling assigned the Personnel Matters Review Committee (PMRC) to conduct the hearing provided for under UWS 4.08, and to provide its recommendation to the full Board as to whether Professor Burton should be dismissed. Under Wis. Admin. Code s. UWS 4.01 and Regent Policy Document 20-23, a tenured faculty member may be dismissed only for just cause and only by the Board of Regents. The PMRC reviewed the record, received briefs from Dr. Burton and Chancellor Shields, and held oral arguments on May 10, 2018. Pursuant to Dr. Burton's request, the oral arguments were held in open session. In a closed session on May 10, 2018, the PMRC unanimously determined that there is just cause for Professor Burton's termination.

On Thursday, June 7, 2018, at a closed session of the Board, the chair of the PMRC reported its findings and decision to the Board. The Board voted to adopt the findings and decision of the PMRC and to dismiss Dr. Burton. The parties were not present for the closed session for the Board's vote.

Based upon the record, the written submissions of the parties, and the recommendation of the PMRC, the Board makes the following Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and issues the attached Order:

FINDINGS OF FACT

1. Dr. Sabina Burton is an associate tenured professor in the UW-Platteville Department of Criminal Justice. She began her employment in 2009 and was tenured in 2013.

2. In fall 2012 there was an incident during which a former professor at UW-Platteville, Dr. Gibson, handed a student a note with the words "call me" written on it along with his phone number. The professor alleged that he was conducting a "breach experiment." ^I

<< Breach-experiments are not part of the CJ curriculum. Gibson did not have required permission to conduct any such “breach experiments.” The same professor approached other female students and made multiple sexually explicit comments in class and to female students. It is ridiculous for the Board to attempt to cover up sexual harassment by swallowing such a lame excuse for Gibson’s behavior. A grievance committee called Gibson’s actions “slut-shaming.” >>

The student reported the incident to Dr. Burton who then reported it to Dean Throop because of sexual harassment concerns.

3. Following the alleged breach experiment, Dean Throop, the director of Human Resource and the department chair counseled and reprimanded the professor "for performing a stupid stunt" and informed him that such behavior was unacceptable. The professor's contract was later non-renewed.

These problems were pointed out in Dr. Burton’s rebuttals and documentation that was given to the hearing panel but were excluded from the record to the board. The professor was still at the school two and a half years later. He was recommended for merit pay and he was elected to be chair of the Criminal Justice department. His note to the student was not mentioned as being any part of the reason for his non-renewal. An appeal panel found that he should not be non-renewed, but should be retained. Chancellor Shields overturned the appeal panel’s recommendation and non-renewed Dr. Gibson on his own authority. The reasons cited by Chancellor Shields did not include any misconduct having anything to do with the breach experiment/sexual harassment incident. The main reason for his non-renewal seems to be that he was elected to be chair of the department and tried to take his position as chair. Dr. Gibson was a victim of the same corruption that Dr. Burton faces, and he exposed it in an email to the department (643 - Chair Recommendation 2-17-15).7777 This email shows that he was still in the department over two years after the sexual harassment incident, that the Respondents paint as “just”a breach experiment. He was non-renewed because he, opposed Dalecki. >>

A breach experiment is an experiment that seeks to examine people's reactions to violations of commonly accepted social rules or norms.

4. Even though administration addressed the Gibson breach experiment, Dr. Burton did not feel as though the situation had been adequately addressed and continued to raise issues surrounding it. << This is false and misleading for several reasons: The administration did not address the Gibson incident. It was not a legitimate breach experiment. Dr. Burton’s concern was not that the university had inadequately addressed the Gibson incident. She raised issues that she was being retaliated against for her advocacy of the student. The harassed student expressed her emotional distress to Burton over the way the administration handled the incident. Dr. Burton became a victim too, as then CJ chair Dr. Caywood, who was close to Dr. Gibson, retaliated against Dr. Burton for having reported the incident outside of the department. >>

Dr. Burton engaged in behavior that department members and administration found disruptive and harassing.

The Board of Regents’ policy statement on academic freedom states: “But it is not the proper role of the university to attempt to shield individuals from ideas and opinions they, or others, find unwelcome, disagreeable, or even deeply offensive. Although the university greatly values civility, concerns about civility and mutual respect can never be used as justification for closing off discussion of ideas, however offensive or disagreeable those ideas may be to some members within the university community. “ https://www.wisconsin.edu/regents/policies/commitment-to-academic-freedom-and-freedom-of-expression/

The “behavior” described seemed to have only to do with Burton’s emails and other electronic communications. No member of her department ever complained that she published the audio recordings in the court record or the transcripts either. All of the complaints were about Burton’s emails. Even the Board agrees that the reason they fired Burton is because other department members found her behavior to be disruptive and harassing.

The Board of Regents’ policy statement on academic freedom states: “The freedom to debate and discuss the merits of competing ideas does not mean that members of the university community may say whatever they wish, wherever they wish. Consistent with longstanding practice informed by law, institutions within the System may restrict expression that violates the law, that falsely defames a specific individual, that constitutes a genuine threat or discriminatory harassment, that unjustifiably invades substantial privacy or confidentiality interests, or that is otherwise directly incompatible with the functioning of the university. “

There is no indication in the Board’s findings that they considered whether the allegations of harassment and threats made by Burton were true or whether Burton’s allegations, which were considered to be harassment, were justified.

False. This sentence implies that all department members found Burton’s behavior to be disruptive, however, the only department members interviewed by investigator Roter were Solar, Strobl and Fuller. The report falsely listed Dr. Dalecki as a “faculty member in Criminal Justice, former Chair.” The investigation did not include interviews with any students. There were approximately 13 faculty members and staff members in the CJ department at the time, but the investigator only spoke with the three department members, all of whom lacked credibility. Investigator Roter’s report does not address credibility of the faculty members interviewed. Each of them, and Dr. Dalecki, had reason to lie to get Burton fired. Even the Roter report did not indicate that Burton was disruptive but that the tension and frustration created by the failure to resolve the issues was what disrupted the department and institution. The failure of the institution to provide grievance hearings to resolve the issues was the cause of the disruption according to the investigation report, not Dr. Burton.

The Roter report states: “It should be noted that there have been numerous attempts to resolve issues and conflicts between Dr. Burton and the administration and colleagues through grievances and complaint processes, informal developmental discussions, and through mediation and nothing seems to have led to any kind of satisfactory resolution for any of the parties. There is a high level of mistrust and frustration reported by all parties involved and interviewed. Though this is not in the purview of the investigation, my assessment is this tension and frustration is creating a negative learning and professional environment which is disruptive and adversely impacting students and the advancement of the educational mission of the department and institution.” It doesn’t identify who “attempted” to resolve issues. Burton attempted to resolve them through grievances and mediation and the administration blocked her attempts. It does not say anything about the administration’s violation of Burton’s rights as she explained to Roter in the audio recorded interview.

The Board’s statement seems to rely on statements from witnesses who gave testimony on 5-25-17 while Burton was not present due to severe illness.

The Roter report states “All Dr. Burton’s colleagues interviewed reported feeling threatened and/or harassed by Dr. Burton or witnessed Dr. Burton engage in those kinds of behaviors towards others in the department, many of whom are no longer at the University.” Dr. Burton’s chair, Dr. Strobl cannot be considered a “colleague” as she was Burton’s boss. Likewise, Dr. Fuller was Burton’s boss in the online program. So, the only colleague interviewed was Solar, who lacks credibility for a number of reasons. Why did Roter circumscribe the investigation unfairly? That is a question Roter should answer on cross-examination. But Burton was never afforded opportunity to cross-examine Roter.

Dr. Burton engaged in appropriate requests for relief from retaliation. Dr. Burton spoke up against her diminished role in her department despite the seniority she had achieved. She addressed those who participated in and benefitted from the harassment Burton suffered. Dr. Burton asked for investigations and/or grievance hearings to address the adverse actions against her, including alleged defamation, altering of evaluation scores, isolation in the department. Those who bullied her called her the bully. In their allegations of disruptive and harassing behaviors the adverse witnesses were vague and/or did not provide supporting evidence. Other members in the department were discouraged from speaking to Dr. Burton. One member described the methods in text-messages to Dr. Burton. Another member of the department who Dr. Burton initially listed as witness was terminated before her last hearing. That member alleged that he was discriminated by disability. The investigation was circumscribed to include only members of the department who Dr. Burton had previously complained of, and who were not credible. >>

5. Following a long series of concerns regarding Dr. Burton's conduct, and following numerous counseling conversations,

<< The record does not include any mention of numerous counseling conversations with Dr. Burton. Throop said that she counselled Dr. Burton in writing, not conversationally (transcript 5-25-17 pg 37 line 22-25) If Burton had been verbally “counselled” she would probably have audio recorded the session. The whole point was that nobody would talk to Burton because she allegedly recorded everything. Strobl was told not to talk to Burton. Lattis told her that. Stroble said that she was frustrated by not being able to talk to Burton about matters. Not only was Dr. Burton never counseled, there are other problems with this statement that make it false:

· the communication training mandated by Chancellor Shields and Provost Den Herder for the CJ department was never conducted. How is Burton to know what is acceptable communication if mandated communication training is not conducted? Clearly, the other members of the department were the ones in need of the communication training, not Dr. Burton. The administration ordered communication training only to demonstrate that they were “doing something.” But they didn’t.

· The university denied Dr. Burton access to mediation. In her rebuttal to the Throop LOD Burton wrote “My accusations are not groundless or unwarranted. I wanted to present evidence supporting my claims in mediation, but that was denied me, at a grievance hearing, but that was denied me and in a formal investigation but that too was denied me.”

None of these alleged counseling sessions led to any sort of discipline against Burton, short of termination.

Dean Throop issued Dr. Burton a letter of direction on October 28, 2014. Dr. Burton responded by indicating that she would not follow the directions in the letter. << This is a false statement of fact.

· Dr. Burton responded soon after she received the LOD in an email: “You are violating my due process rights. I have repeatedly asked for a grievance and not received it. I asked for an internal investigation and the school denied my request. The school canceled the mediation, not I. I have supplied material supporting my allegations.” The same day Dean Throop informed the HR Director Lohmann that she was already working on a Ch.6 complaint against Dr. Burton. Throop told Lohmann in an email “She [Dr. Burton] already rejected it.” in reference to the above email. That was a false statement. Burton had not rejected the LOD but had asked for a grievance hearing to address it.

· Dr. Burton filed a grievance to address the LOD but her due process right to be heard was violated. Dr. Burton was due a grievance hearing within 20 days by policy, but no hearing was ever scheduled. This is a material error of law. (Weyenberg v. UW-Oshkosh, makes clear that such rules are enforceable as statutes. That, combined with UWS 2.02, appears to make them law, and as such, intentional failure to comply with those laws constitutes “misconduct in public office” and a violation of Wis. Stats. 946.12.) The Throop LOD was used as a basis for the allegations, but Dr. Burton was not given opportunity to address its unacceptable, untrue and completely unreasonable nature. Failure of the administration to hear Burton’s grievance concerning the Throop LOD is a violation of due process law. IMPORTANT

· The Barraclough investigation report states: “Throop uses the fact that Dr. Burton filed a complaint against Ms. Deb Rice, alleging Rice defamed Burton in public, as an example of Dr. Burton's refusal to follow this direction.” HR Director Lohmann spoke to Deb Rice and verified that she indeed acted inappropriately. He recommended disciplinary actions against Rice but the Chancellor and Dean Throop never followed through with it. (Barraclough_Report- pg3, para4). The Board argues that Dr. Burton should be fired because she filed a legitimate complaint with the HR director against Deb Rice. This is retaliation for a protected activity. The causal connection is clear 1. Throop wanted to fire Burton from before she issued the letter of direction, 2. Throop considered Burton’s grievance against Rice to be an example of Burton’s refusal to follow her direction, 3. The Board fired Burton because she refused to follow the direction 4. The board used Throop’s assertion of Burton’s refusal as their support for the decision, 5. There is no evidence in the record, other than Throop’s assertion, that Burton refused to follow the directions, 6. The board fired Burton because she filed a grievance against Rice. IMPORTANT >>

6. Dr. Burton filed a lawsuit against UW-Platteville alleging unlawful discrimination, including retaliation. Despite being provided with two raises and being awarded tenure following the Gibson incident, in part Dr. Burton alleged that she was discriminated against for raising concerns related to the Gibson incident. Issues stemming from the Gibson Incident have been thoroughly litigated at the state and federal level. In both the federal district court for the Western District of Wisconsin and the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals, Dr. Burton's claims were dismissed.

<< Error in Fact: In the transcript of the 5-25-17 hearing Throop said that she instigated two raises, the second being “a much more substantial raise.” However, Dr. Burton’s paycheck did not reflect two raises initiated by Throop. There was one inequity adjustment (as Burton was underpaid in comparison to her male colleagues) and then there was another modest increase in pay that seems to have been given to everyone. We can go another route too. We can say that the raises show that Burton was progressing well.

Error in Law: The issues that stem from the Gibson sexual harassment incident have not been thoroughly litigated. In fact the 7^th Circuit court dismissed Burton’s claim as she (through Attorney Hawks) should have submitted the material evidence before summary judgment. Hawks failed to submit critical evidence despite the fact that Burton had provided it to him on time. In fact, this was AAG Kilpatrick’s argument to the 7^th Circuit court, that Burton’s attorney failed to submit the evidence and the court agreed. A grievance committee that heard Burton’s grievance against CJ chair Thomas Caywood agreed that Burton was treated poorly and recommended that Throop repair Dr. Burton’s reputation. Chancellor Shields did not issue a decision within the 30 days required by policy. Instead UWS Attorney Lattis got involved and had the grievance committee re-deliberate the grievance taking out reference to sexual discrimination, sexual harassment and retaliation. In the end, Chancellor Shields blamed Burton equally with Dr. Caywood for miscommunication and ordered communication training for the entire CJ department which was never conducted.

Burton alleges that Chancellor Shields violated her rights by falsely accusing her in his statement of charges that she misrepresented facts of the Gibson incident. Yet, Chancellor Shields failed to provide any support for his allegation. This is a defamatory statement that led to Burton’s termination. The Gibson incident is clearly relevant to this case as Chancellor Shields would not have mentioned it in his statement of charges if it were not. He did not identify any false statement by Dr. Burton. Burton did not make any misrepresentations about the incident.

7. The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals noted the following in its decision (Burton v. Board ofRegents of University of Wisconsin System, 851 F.3d 690 (7th Cir. 2017)):

a. Moreover, the record demonstrates that Throop had a factual basis for each of the allegations she leveled against Burton in the letter of direction, and Burton failed to provide evidence that the allegations were pretextual. Indeed, the district court stated that Burton did not dispute the truth of the allegations, only "how Throop perceived and characterized those events, and whether Throop should have accepted Burton's explanations for each of them. " Burton, 171 F.Supp.3d at 846. These are exactly the type of personnel management decisions that federal courts do not second-guess. We intervene only where "an employer's reason for [an adverse action] is without factual basis or is completely unreasonable. " Hobgood

v. m. Gaming Bd., 731 F.3d 635, 646 (7th Cir. 2013). This is plainly not such a situation. (851 F.3d at 698)(emphasis original).

“Significant, unexplained or systematic deviations from established policies or practices can no doubt be relative and probative circumstantial evidence of [unlawful] intent.” (Hobgood v. Ill Gaming). The administration routinely and systematically deviated significantly from established policies and practices in Burton’s case. We can list a lot of examples. This should be one of our main attacks. Show where the policy was violated significantly.

Throop didn’t hold an election
Solar violated search policies and Sabina called him on it.
Burton was denied a hearing to address Dalecki grievance.
Burton was denied a hearing to address the Throop grievance.
Burton was denied investigations she requested.
The appeal panel met and based their findings on testimony presented in Burton’s absence.
Burton was not given opportunity to cross-examine witnesses.
Bensky lied in a motion to dismiss.
The administration failed to provide the state court with documents it listed in its findings within 30 days.
Etc.

<< This statement contains a material error of fact. The federal court stated in their decision that Burton disputed the truth of the allegations in the Throop LOD (Dkt 90 Opinion Order on Motions for Summary Judgment (00248908xCECB9)). It stated on page 24 “In this case, Burton relies on evidence of pretext: she contends that the allegations in Throop’s letter of direction were so obviously false that they must have been a cover for retaliatory animus.” So, the Seventh Circuit court of Appeals got it wrong.

In her rebuttal to the Letter of Direction, that Dr. Burton provided to the grievance committee chair, in accordance with policy, on 11-12-14 she wrote

· “I did not involve any students in a campaign against Dr. Dalecki. I had a grievance against Dr. Dalecki. Dean Throop’s use of the word “campaign” implies that I am passing out bumper stickers and standing on soap boxes but that is not true.”

· “Dean Throop’s “fear that I may have instigated the complaint against Dr. Stackman” is unfounded, unwarranted and malicious. She has no evidence to support her statement because it is not true.“

· “I suggested to one student that she go to Student Affairs for her complaint about Dr. Stackman. By using the plural form of the word “student” Dean Throop implies that there were more than one and that is not accurate. Dean Throop intentionally misconstrues facts.”

· “My accusations are not groundless or unwarranted. I wanted to present evidence supporting my claims in mediation, but that was denied me, at a grievance hearing, but that was denied me and in a formal investigation but that too was denied me.”

· In her email to Dean Throop on 11-12-14 Dr. Burton wrote “I am sorry, but I cannot accept your letter of direction dated Oct 28, 2014 and delivered on Oct 29, 2014. I have filed a grievance against you concerning your letter of direction and look forward to resolving the issues soon.” Dr. Burton made the argument that the LOD is completely unreasonable.

That Dr. Burton’s former attorney Hawks failed to make these valid arguments to the court does not diminish the material fact that Dr. Burton filed a grievance alleging that the LOD was completely unreasonable and that its basis is untrue. The court acted on an incomplete record and misrepresented arguments. Dr. Burton has not wavered in her assertions that the Throop LOD is based on false statements of fact and is completely unreasonable.

b. There is no evidence in the record that Throop's complaint against Burton was retaliation for her protected activity, but there is evidence that Burton decided not to heed any of the "direction" contained in the letter.

<< Throop filed a complaint against Burton on 1-5-15. This complaint is loaded with emails that are protected activities. See the Whistleblower response of 9-24-18.

Since the Board makes this statement we can present evidence to refute their statement. There is indeed evidence in the record that proves that the Throop LOD was retaliation for Burton’s protected activity. Throop specifically named an email from Burton on Oct 2, 2014 as reason for the LOD. Throop later lied about including the email in the LOD. That email was from Burton to Shields asking for an investigation into retaliation. There is clear causal connection between Burton’s protected activity, the Oct 2 email, and the adverse action, Throop’s LOD. There is causal connection between the Throop LOD and the Board’s decision to fire Burton also. So, there is causal connection between Burton’s protected activity, the Oct 2 email, and the Board’s decision to fire her. IMPORTANT.

Throop said at the hearing of 5-25-17 that Sabina told her that she would not follow the directives. This was a lie. Throop is not credible. In the Burke report from Oct. 2016 Throop told the investigator Burke that she believed Burton’s filing of a grievance was evidence that Burton decided not to heed the directions. This contradicts her earlier statement in which she claimed Burton told her she wouldn’t follow the directives. Also, admonishing Burton for filing a grievance is against the law.

The appeal court got it wrong. Burton didn’t say that she wouldn’t heed the LOD. She wrote that she could not accept it as reason why she filed the grievance. Burton didn’t accept the allegations because they weren’t true and because they were bogus. She never stated anywhere that she would not follow the directives. In fact, she stated clearly that she would follow the directive in her rebuttal to the LOD that she not involve students in her disputes. She kept this directive and Shields falsely accused her of talking to students about it in her classes.

Then, as now, Burton argues that Throop should never have written the letter because it was based on lies and bogus allegations. Pretext "involves more than just faulty reasoning or mistaken judgment on the part of the employer; it is [a] lie, specifically a phony reason for some action. " Harden v. Marion Cty. Sheriffs Dep't, 799 F.3d 857, 864 (7th Cir. 2015) (quoting Argyropoulos v. City ofA1ton, 539 F.3d 724, 735 (7th Cir. 2008)). There is plenty of evidence that either the letter of direction contained such lies and phony reasons for the action. A reasonable jury could easily find that the letter of direction was caused by Burton's protected activities. (see Throop LOD rebuttal)

The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals noted the following in its decision (Burton v. Board ofRegents of University of Wisconsin System, 851 F.3d 690 (7th Cir. 2017)):

“The district court was necessarily limited to arguments presented in Burton’s opposition brief. After all, “a lawsuit is not a game of hunt the peanut. Employment discrimination cases are extremely fact ‐ intensive, and neither appellate courts nor district courts are ‘obliged in our adversary system to scour the record looking for factual disputes ... .’” Greer v. Bd. of Educ. , 267 F.3d 723, 727 (7th Cir. 2001) (quoting Waldridge v. Am. Hoechst Corp. , 24 F.3d 918, 921 ‒ 22 (7th Cir. 1993)). Instead, “[i]t is a well ‐ settled rule that a party opposing a summary judgment motion must inform the trial judge of the reasons, legal or factual, why summary judgment should not be entered.” Liberles v. Cook Cty. , 709 F.2d 1122, 1126 (7th Cir. 1983). “If [the nonmoving party] does not do so, and loses the motion, it cannot raise such reasons on appeal.” Id. This rule prevents Burton from raising specific factual arguments that were absent from her briefing below even though her general claims were plainly before the court. See Fednav Int’l Ltd. v. Cont’l Ins. Co. , 624 F.3d 834, 841 (7th Cir. 2010) (“[A] party has waived the ability to make a specific argument for the first time on appeal when the party failed to present that specific argument to the district court, even though the issue may have been before the district court in more general terms.”). Thus, Burton is limited to the facts laid out in Part I above and to the particular protected activities and adverse actions that she argued below.”

In the judicial review Dr. Burton is not limited to the facts and arguments laid out in federal court’s record.

Basic to every purpose of the System is the search for truth (Regent Policy Document 1-1 (formerly 88-8)), (36.01(2) ). Reliance on a court order that admittedly excludes this search for truth (hunt for peanuts) is a material error in law. The appeal panel and the Board of Regents in this matter have clearly not searched for truth if they rely on the court’s findings without reliance on Dr. Burton’s evidence that her former attorney failed to present to the court.

Dr. Burton’s rebuttals are an important element of this case and should be considered by the Board. The Appellate court considered only the facts laid out in Part I of a federal court brief. Limiting the Board’s or the appeal panel’s consideration to this brief in a federal court, by relying on the decisions of the courts, is an error in law. The court’s findings contain material errors in fact because the record before the court did not contain Dr. Burton’s arguments and evidence that was provided to the appeal hearing panel.

c. Professor Burton undoubtedly feels that she has been treated unfairly by some of her superiors at the University because she reported alleged harassment and proceeded with this case. Yet the record does not support her claims. During the relevant period, Burton was granted tenure by a unanimous vote and the University held a public ceremony celebrating Burton's receipt of a grant from AT&T. Dean Throop even sought an upward salary adjustment for her after she had brought a charge with the Wisconsin ERD. (851 F.3d at 698-699).

<< The Board argues that an employer should be allowed to harass, intimidate and retaliate against any employee who was treated fairly in one or two instances. By this standard any targeted employee could be given a small pay increase during intense retaliation in order to derail any chance the employee has of ever winning a lawsuit. What does it cost an employer to give a pay increase to someone and then fire them? What benefit is a pay increase to an employee who is shortly thereafter fired? What benefit is tenure when the administration violates every right the employee should be afforded by tenure? What benefit is a ceremony to receive a grant when the ability to use the grant funds is taken away from the employee? This is just a ridiculous argument.

“No one would question the retaliatory effect of many actions that put the complainant in a more unfriendly working environment: actions like moving the person from a spacious, brightly lit office to a dingy closet, depriving the person of previously available support services (like secretarial help or a desktop computer), or cutting off challenging assignments. Nothing indicates why a different form of retaliation — namely, retaliating against a complainant by permitting her fellow employees to punish her for invoking her rights under Title VII — does not fall within the statute. The law deliberately does not take a "laundry list" approach to retaliation, because unfortunately its forms are as varied as the human imagination will permit.” Retaliation is not limited to pay related issues.

Dr. Burton received an inequity adjustment that did not bring her pay to parity with a junior male faculty member. So, even though it was an increase in pay, it was still discriminatory action. The other “raise” was a small pay increase that everyone in the UW System received. The issue of the grant from AT&T was one of the worst acts of retaliation against Dr. Burton in the early days of this matter. Support for Dr. Burton’s efforts to build a Cyber Security program at UW Platteville was unfairly and suddenly withdrawn (ZA - GrievanceCommissionFindings-4-19-13). 7777 A grievance committee member told Dr. Burton “it does, certainly from a third party, um, just reading what I read, it did have a feel like the rug was pulled out from under you.“ (audio exhibit A6) Evidence indicates that Dean Throop and Provost Den Herder pulled their support because Dr. Burton asked Republican Representative Travis Tranel to be in the check presentation ceremony (Dkt 37-4 Exh JJJ - 1-24 email to Provost (00218271xCECB9)). 7777 Evidence indicates that Chair Caywood pulled his support because Dr. Burton had helped a student with a sexual harassment incident. He since admitted under oath that he “probably owes Dr. Burton an apology.” Throop also admitted that she owed Burton an apology but Burton was never given an apology. >>

8. Prior department chairs experienced significant difficulty trying to manage Dr. Burton.

In January 2016, Dr. Staci Strobl was hired from outside of the UW-Platteville organization as Department Chair and Associate professor in the Department of Criminal Justice.

· Dr. Strobl verbally accepted the position on 2/24/2015. She began as chair in about June 2015. Dr. Burton had a good relationship with Dr. Strobl. After going through the mandated Title IX training at UWP in spring 2016 Dr. Burton felt encouraged to bring up again the retaliation and defamation that was still affecting her in the department. Dr. Burton asked for a grievance to address the content of the 2014 Throop LOD and for a grievance against Ms. Rice to address the several defamatory statements Rice made about Burton, among others that Burton had a mental illness. However, both grievances were turned down again. Shortly after Dr. Burton was threatened by an administrator (Dr. Dalecki) and then pulled off a $400,000 grant application by Dr. Strobl. Dr. Strobl soon gave Burton the cold shoulder. She did not talk to Burton.

· Prior department chairs did experience significant difficulty trying to retaliate against Dr. Burton. She asked for grievance hearings against them but her valid requests to address their retaliation were denied. The board makes this “difficulty” appear to be Dr. Burton’s fault, but it was caused by the failure of the administration to properly address Burton’s grievances that caused the difficulty. The Board fired Burton for her requests for fair due process. The causal connection is clear. Burton only caused “difficulty” by asking for fair treatment. >>

9. Almost immediately Dr. Strobl was consumed with issues surrounding Burton, and it took up most of her time.

· On 10-7-15 Dr. Burton was a respondent at a conference in Platteville and the conference went extremely well. Dr. Burton got lots of praise from people in her department for her response to one of the speakers. Dr. Fuller told her “I am glad to have you back.” Dr. Solar was very friendly to her. The new chair, Dr. Strobl, praised her several times and she and Valerie Stackman gave her big hugs. The turnaround was amazing after Dr. Dalecki left. Even Deb Rice exchanged some polite words with Dr. Burton (Timeline).

· On 12/08/15 – Dr. Strobl sat in Dr. Burton’s class and had good things to say about her teaching (Strobl-evalofBurton).7777

· In December 2015 Dr. Strobl gave Burton a Christmas card which said “Thanks for your service to the department!” (x-mas-card-Staci-Strobl-2015).

· If Dr. Burton were a problem, why would she invite Dr. Burton to be part of a grant application for a $400,000 grant? She wouldn’t. It wasn’t until Dr. Burton filed grievances against Throop and Rice that Strobl began to minimize Burton by taking her off the grant application.

· In October 2015 Dr. Strobl asked Dr. Burton to be an instrumental part of the next conference in Sept. 2016. And Dr. Burton was.

· Dr. Strobl didn’t start to have issue with Dr. Burton until after Dr. Burton asked for grievances against Throop and Rice. Evidence indicates that Dr. Strobl was pressured by upper administration to harass Dr. Burton and remove her from a grant. In fact when Dr. Burton asked Dr. Strobl if she needed any help in late May 2016, Dr. Strobl responded with no, and it’s “beyond that.”

· Dr. Strobl called a forum on 11-1-16 to address a Watchdog.org article about the student sexual harassment complaint. Burton asked Strobl if she could attend also and Strobl said ‘of course.’ The meeting was cancelled at the last minute. Comments of Strobl’s husband Matt Michaels, who attended the canceled forum, indicate that Strobl felt pressured by the administration. Strobl herself did not attend. This was audio recorded.

· Just two days later Dr. Strobl resigned as chair, stating “lack of institutional support” and stayed away from her office for the rest of the year.

· There is evidence that the administration pressured Dr. Strobl to say what they wanted her to say. They turned her against Dr. Burton. Strobl became angry with Dr. Burton because she pointed out problems with the grant application.

· Dr. Burton was not allowed to cross-examine Dr. Strobl after she made outlandish assertions to the hearing panel.

· At a post conference meeting on 10-8-15 Dr. Strobl was seriously upset with the administration. She said that she doesn’t get any help and gets blocked by the assistant chancellor for communication. They refused to do a press release for the conference, which is a really big deal. They don’t even get back to her, she said. She said words to the effect that “I can’t seem to do anything right… I am about to lose my cool… The dean is not an obstacle but not helping either… What is it with these guys up there?” She said that she can’t believe how messed up the chancellor’s office is. She said she only invited the Chancellor to give a welcome speech at the conference because she was afraid that otherwise they would sabotage it. Dr. Burton was shocked to see her so upset and at the same time so open with the members of the department. She said a few times words to the effect “this is just between us.” Deb rice stated words to the effect that “the Chancellor didn’t get the job in Chicago so we are stuck with him.” People at the meeting: Fuller, Stackman, Solar, Shulenberg, Deb Rice, Couper, Strobl. Note: Elmer was not allowed to be on the conference committee because he was already on the outs, so he was not present.

· Upon information and belief (a little bird told us), Dr. Strobl was placed on mandatory leave around August 2018. There seems to be strife in the CJ department. This strife cannot be ascribed to Dr. Burton as she has not been in the department. >>

10. Because of ongoing issues and unprofessional behavior that included statements and emails that were considered bullying and harassing, on June 3, 2016, Chancellor Shields issued a second letter of direction to Dr. Burton.

<< - This is a false statement. Chancellor Shields issued the LOD to provide evidence to be later used to fire Dr. Burton. The reasons given in his LOD were pretextual. (ShieldsLOD-Rebuttal). 7777

- I compiled a list of emails Sabina sent that the Board used as basis to fire her: (Burton-emails-used-to-fire-her.xlsx) – Saved as pdf and word files, Also saved as web page (Burton-emails-used-to-fire-her.htm). The online links only work in the .htm web page version. This shows reasons why each of the emails do not warrant dismissal. These are the only communications from Dr. Burton that were included in the record. That’s it. There are no others in the record (that I know of). At the 9-19-17 hearing Atty Kasieta asked Chancellor Shields if these were the only emails for which Sabina was being processed for dismissal and he said something like ‘This is representative of them’ and ‘these are what the list was culled down to.’ So, these are the only ones we need to address.

11. In fall 2016, departmental problems related to Dr. Burton's behavior persisted, and as a result Dr. Strobl resigned as department chair in November 2016.

· Dr. Strobl cited “Lack of Institutional Support” as the reason she stepped down from the chair position. Her decision was not a result of anything Burton did.

· Dr. Strobl complained multiple times about her complaints about the administration in department meetings. CJ had to fight for every position because the money was diverted to other departments.

· When it came out that Throop was a contestant in the Interim Provost spot Strobl said that it would be good because then the department wouldn’t need to deal with her. She felt that Throop didn’t care about the CJ program. She felt unsupported in a lot of things. Even though CJ brought in a lot of money that money was diverted to other programs. CJ was highly understaffed in comparison to other departments.

· Dr. Strobl stated in the hearing of 5-25-17 that her reason for stepping down was due to Dr. Burton. However, she also said that she had been complaining to Provost Throop often, about Dr. Burton. There is no record of these complaints. Dr. Burton was not allowed to cross-examine Dr. Strobl. Note: Ask for all such communications from Strobl where she complained of Burton in discovery and deposition. Strobl claims that she stepped down because the administration wasn’t doing anything about Burton. But at the time Burton was being investigated under threat of dismissal for a bogus complaint by Rice. The complaint against Burton was dismissed after Strobl resigned and while she was still gone. This indicates that the reason for Strobl’s resignation had nothing to do with Burton. Why would the administration dismiss the Rice complaint? Why not interview people to find out what’s going on in the department and act on the investigation? Oh, right, because the administration is corrupt and was trying to cover up their cover ups.

· Dr. Strobl made wild, outlandish claims that Dr. Burton was not allowed to rebut in a hearing. Dr. Burton asked to cross-examine Dr. Strobl but strobl was not made available for cross examination and Dr. Burton was not given adequate time to cross examine her or other hostile witnesses.

· The time they gave Burton had no basis in her witness lists, the evidence to be presented, or the estimate of time she believed she would need.

12. On December 16, 2016, Interim Provost Elizabeth Throop and Interim Dean Melissa E.

Gormley filed a complaint pursuant to Wisconsin Administrative Code s. UWS 4.02(1) seeking the termination of Dr. Burton from her position as a tenured professor in the Department of Criminal Justice.

<< See the rebuttal of the Throop/Gormley complaint for the numerous problems with this complaint. >>

Again, the complaint contained false allegations and condemned Burton for actions that were protected by law.

The Throop/Gormley complaint copied sections from a secret Solar grievance almost verbatim. Dr. Solar threatened Burton and her husband with “consequences of his choosing” in Nov. 2016. Shortly after Solar filed a grievance against Burton but didn’t want Burton to be informed. His grievance contained emails that weren’t addressed to him strongly suggesting that Throop and Gormley collaborated with Solar in getting Burton dismissed. Burton didn’t get Solar’s secret complaint until a year later and was never given the opportunity to defend herself against his allegations. For example, Solar alleged that Burton gave her husband unauthorized access to her school email account and used an email Burton forwarded to her husband as evidence. Roger Burton was mentioned in the email Burton forwarded to her husband.

13. To investigate the complaint, Chancellor Shields appointed Dr. Petra Roter, of UW System Administration, to investigate the matter. Dr. Roter submitted her report to

a. Dr. Burton recorded a series of UW-Platteville internal conversations, meetings and proceedings without prior consent or notification to all parties involved in the conversations.

· Dr. Burton had consent of one of the members of the communications as required and allowed by law. Dr. Burton did not require consent from more than one person in the discussion. She only required her own consent, which she had.

· Burton attended the open meetings and recorded them legally. Dr. Burton is not alone in recording meetings. Many of her colleagues have done so. None of the meetings Burton recorded were closed. The PMRC at the May 10, 2018 hearing confirmed that all meetings Burton recorded were open.

· This clever artifice attempts to make Burton’s actions seem to have been committed wrongly by saying she didn’t have consent and didn’t notify all parties involved in the conversations. It is like saying that a race car driver drove his race car at 128 miles per hour, which exceeds the legal speed limit on Wisconsin Highways. There is no point to the statement because the driver was on a track with no speed limit. Similarly, Dr. Burton is not required to tell all parties, or any party involved in the conversations of her recordings. The Board cites no violation of law or policy. So, the comment was used as reason to fire Dr. Burton in violation of law.

· Burton’s recordings were made as part of her whistleblowing activities, which are protected by the Whistleblower law.

In addition, these recordings, which included confidential discussions of employee performance, were published to the internet by Dr. Burton's husband, Roger Burton, with Dr. Burton's knowledge and consent.

· Dr. Burton gave the audios to her former attorney, Tim Hawks. Attorney Hawks released them to the court and to defense counsel for the Board. (Dkt 43-7). 7777 (Dkt 98). 7777

· The defense admits, through their attorneys Brad Schimel and Anne Bensky, that “Plaintiff has every right to post documents that have been publicly filed in federal court on the Internet” (c2-Dkt-61-Brief.pdf) pg 16 para 3. The recordings were all publicly filed in federal court. (C2-Dkt-61 is not in record provided by Board to state court because it came later. – be sure to add this to the record.) IMPORTANT

· Disciplining Dr. Burton for publishing these audios is a violation of the whistleblower law and is a violation of her First Amendment rights.

· Nobody ever asked Dr. Burton or her husband to remove any audiotapes from any website (Transcript-11-30-17 – pg28-29).

· Members of the university published the audios and transcripts unredacted in several document packages. This included Throop/Gormley, Shields, the hearing panel, Jess Lathrop, the Board of Regents. This is disparate treatment - IMPORTANT

· There has been nothing on the recordings identified as “confidential.” There is no law saying anything is "confidential." The Board even admits that Burton didn't violate any written rules or laws.

· The meetings were open meetings. Dr. Burton admits to recording open meetings. The responsibility to protect confidential discussion rested on the chair of the meeting, not Burton. The meeting chair could have closed the meeting, but didn’t. If anyone should be fired it would be the chair of those meetings.

· Burton recorded the open meetings as a whistleblower. In one of the meetings one can hear Burton being slapped and shushed by a colleague in an effort to prevent her from speaking.

· The board cannot say what Dr. Burton knew at the time. There is no evidence indicating that she knew what her husband would publish.

o In the meeting with Dr. Roter, Dr. Burton stated that her husband, with her knowledge, organized the website with a timeline diary. She did not tell Dr. Roter that she knew that her husband had uploaded the audios in question to the website.

o The record shows that Dr. Burton stated that she did not know that her husband had published the audios asserting “I wasn’t aware of the additional pieces.” She trusted him to be responsible. (Transcript-11-30-17 – pg64).

· Dr. Burton recorded the audios to expose retaliation against her (Transcript-11-30-17 – pg65).

· After Dr. Burton became aware of the complaint against her and the existence of the audios on her husband’s website, she immediately asked him to remove the audios, which he did.

· Dr. Burton satisfied the requirements of the whistleblower law by disclosing the information concerning the violations of law and policy to her supervisors:

o She gave the information to Dr. Barraclough in the investigation ordered by Chancellor Shields on Sept 23, 2015 11 AM to 1 PM. She gave him the audios and told him about the violations (Barraclough_Report - page 3 para 3).

o She informed HR Director Lohmann that Fuller and Dalecki tried to prevent her from speaking at the meetings.

o She informed the Appeal Hearing panel in the hearing on 11-30-17 (Transcript-11-30-17 – pg 65).

· Disclosure of the information (audio recordings and transcripts) is not expressly prohibited by state or federal law. Nor is it expressly prohibited by Board guidance, University policy, or either of the two letters of direction. Wis. Stat. 230.81(1) states: “An employee with knowledge of information the disclosure of which is not expressly prohibited by state or federal law, rule or regulation may disclose that information to any other person.” So, the Board fired Burton for an act that she is expressly allowed by law to perform. The board admits that Burton violated no law or rule but that she violated some unspoken and unwritten “expectation.” This “expectation” had never been expressed to Burton. IMPORTANT

· Dr. Burton disclosed the information to her attorney as provided by Wis. Stat. 230.81(1). The attorney, in Dr. Burton’s name, disclosed the information to the court and to Dr. Burton’s supervisors, the Board of Regents. This satisfied the requirements of Wis. Stat. 230.81(1)(a), and therefore Dr. Burton is protected under Wis. Stat. 230.83. IMPORTANT.

· The charge that Dr. Burton published the information is retaliatory. This is a violation of Wis. Stat. 230.83(1)

· Dr. Burton recorded the audios on reasonable belief that they demonstrated violations of state or federal law, rule or regulation per Wis. Stat. 230.80(5).

· Dr. Burton recorded the audios on reasonable belief that they demonstrated mismanagement (incompetent, wrongful, negligent or arbitrary and capricious and which adversely affect the efficient accomplishment of an agency function) or abuse of authority in state or local government, a substantial waste of public funds or a danger to public health and safety.

· Lots of other reasons why this is discriminatory in Open Letter (Regents-Decision-6-7-18).

· The Board failed to provide the audios to the state court as part of the record. The audios were part of the record before the Board on 5-10-18. A data stick was mailed to Burton and contained several audio recordings that someone apparently downloaded from Roger Burton’s website on 11-9-16 (files were created on 11-9-16). The Board provided only transcripts in the state court record. Dr. Burton didn’t create the transcripts, but they were written by her husband, Roger Burton. So, how could Sabina Burton have given these transcripts to her husband when he made them? I believe the Board is afraid to give the audio recordings to the court because the audios prove that the meetings were open meetings. The Board does not want the court to scrutinize the audios. The Board wants the court to be confused about exactly what audio recordings they based their decision on. We could argue that the Board’s real reason for firing Burton was because her husband published partial and un-finished transcripts of open meetings, that he created himself, and not because of anything Dr. Burton did.

· In discovery, Ask the Board to identify which statement(s) is/are “confidential.” Then, show that the administration published, unredacted, the exact statement(s).

· From Henige: (There are also strong similar words in the Open Meetings Compliance Guide.)

“The public has a particularly strong interest in being informed about public officials who have been derelict in [their] duty”

“the fact that reputations may be damaged would not outweigh the benefit to the public interest in obtaining inspection”

“In the present matter, therefore, although release of disciplinary records might cause some reputational harm to Mr. Frakes, the subject of the records, we may nonetheless consider the public's interest in information about misconduct by public officials to weigh more heavily in the balancing of interests.”

These are from https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=17404988326756023143&q=2006+wi+app+227&hl=en&as_sdt=4,50

And cite https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=13896041042368062591&q=2006+wi+app+227&hl=en&as_sdt=4,50

“In the instant situation the public interest to be served by permitting inspection is to inform the public whether defendant mayor has been derelict in his duty in not instigating disciplinary proceedings against policemen because of wrongful conduct disclosed in the report. If the report contains statements of persons having first-hand knowledge, which disclose police misconduct, the fact that reputations may be damaged would not outweigh the benefit to the public interest in obtaining inspection. On the other hand statements based upon hearsay or suspicion, or inconclusive in nature, would be of small public benefit if made public, and might do great harm to reputations.”

b. All of Dr. Burton's colleagues that were interviewed by Dr. Roter reported feeling threatened or harassed by Dr. Burton or witnessed Dr. Burton threatening or harassing others.

First, the wording is misleading. It suggests that Dr. Roter interviewed several of Dr. Burton’s colleagues when in fact she only interviewed one colleague, Dr. Solar. All others who were interviewed were in an administrative position directly accountable to either Dean Gormley or Provost Throop. Dr. Burton alleged that Dr. Solar excluded her from search & screen in violation of policy as part of the retaliatory ‘isolate Burton’ practice in the CJ department. The Roter investigation was circumscribed to include only people who lacked credibility. The investigator did not address credibility issues of those interviewed. Why didn’t Dr. Roter interview any of the dozen other CJ/FI faculty and staff members or any students or any secretarial staff or custodial staff or anyone from other departments? They certainly were available. The investigation was a sham.

<< The board claims that the investigation report was not used by the hearing panel in its recommendation but it quotes from the report often in its decision to provide evidence against Dr. Burton. Clearly, the Board relies heavily on the investigation report. The validity of the investigation report is contested. It cannot stand with only the say so of the Chancellor and Attorney Lattis. >>

Dr. Roter reported that the threats and harassment were focused on undermining the professional integrity of Dr. Burton's colleagues and harming their future employment opportunities including tenure and promotion decisions.

<< Why is the unverified investigation report cited if it is not relied on? This is insane. It is false that Dr. Burton’s actions were focused on undermining professional integrity. It is false that Dr. Burton harassed or threatened anyone. It is false that Dr Burton’s focus was on harming future employment opportunities. This is just insane and unsupported, except by testimony of witnesses who lack any credibility. Why did Dr. Roter not talk directly to Dr. Burton’s colleagues? Why accept hearsay as fact? Dr. Roter emphasized that her role was that of a fact finder but this is an opinion and not a fact. >>

<< Which directive did she violate? They have never pointed to one of the directions and identified what Dr. Burton did that they claim violates it. They just make a flat statement that she violated the LOD but she didn’t. They still haven’t pointed out what directive she supposedly violated.

The only direction she might legitimately be accused of violating was the one demanding that she apologize to Solar. Burton never apologized to Solar because she had nothing to apologize for. Solar should have apologized to Burton. Strangely, they don’t argue that this is the directive she violated. They don’t say what directive she violated.

d. Dr. Burton pulled students into matters and conflicts that are outside the academic mission and environment of the university.

<< Nope. Chancellor Shields sent out an email to students drawing them in, not Burton. He falsely accused Dr. Burton of talking about her issues in class but she didn’t do that. This is an unsupported statement. Even the biased Roter report doesn’t support this. This is an unsubstantiated allegation. And it is false. >>

13. On March 2, 2017, Chancellor Shields sent Dr. Burton a letter enclosing a copy of Dr.

<< Shields emailed the report on March 4 and mailed it priority mail on March 6. See timeline. This is significant because they are trying to show that he didn't have time to alter it.

Dr. Burton contends that report was probably altered by a third person, like the Burke investigation report. If it wasn’t altered, then Dr. Roter committed fraud as she misquoted Burton repeatedly and omitted material information. (see Roter report rebuttal) >>

14. As set forth in UWS 4.02(1), Chancellor Shields also offered to meet with Dr. Burton for an informal discussion prior to making his decision on whether to issue a charge. The meeting was scheduled to take place on March 16, 2017, to be held by Skype, but did not ultimately occur. Dr. Burton did not attend because she objected to the inclusion of Attorney Jennifer Lattis in the meeting but wanted to have her own attorney present.

<< This is another false statement. Chancellor Shields insisted from the beginning that his attorney Lattis were to be present. Dr. Burton objected to Ms. Lattis as she alleged that Ms. Lattis harassed her and there was a pending OLR investigation against Ms. Lattis. Dr. Burton was open to a one-on-one meeting with Shields or with any other administrator or attorney. Shields insisted on Lattis being present. This violated Shields’ requirement to offer an “informal” meeting.

The Board seems to believe Dr. Burton violated a policy by not meeting with Shields and Lattis. Dr. Burton wanted an informal meeting, not an intimidating setting with both Shields and Lattis who have demonstrated ill-will toward Burton. There is no requirement for Burton to meet with Chancellor. There is only the requirement for the Chancellor to offer to meet. Burton’s fear of meeting with the Chancellor and Lattis in the same room is used as reason to fire her unfairly.

15. On March 30, 2017, Chancellor Shields issued Dr. Burton a letter detailing Charges for Dismissal. In that correspondence Chancellor Shields indicated that all faculty members of UW-Platteville are expected to conform to UW System and UW-Platteville expectations and to provide quality service to the students of the university community. Chancellor Shields also stated that faculty members are expected to perform their duties in a manner that engenders trust of the university community, and that Dr. Burton had failed to do so by engaging in the following behaviors:

<< Chancellor Shields did not issue this requirement to any other employee. He admitted at the 9/19/2017 hearing that the CJ department has been plagued by dysfunction for a long time. Demanding Dr. Burton to adhere to some unwritten and never before expressed “expectation” is disparate treatment. >>

a. Publicly disclosing confidential personnel information of colleagues, which constituted a breach of trust and violated the reasonable expectations of UWPlatteville for its faculty;

<< The meetings were open meetings. The chair of the meetings was responsible to close the meetings if/when they thought the content of the discussions warranted confidentiality. Open meetings law in WI permits participants to record open meetings. UWP did not have a policy in place that addressed the recordings of meetings or their content. Nobody complained about confidential content of the meetings being disclosed. Dr. Burton recorded the meetings under the Whistleblower law to documents severe problems. Nobody, not the Chancellor, the Provost or the Dean thought it was necessary to immediately take down the recordings from the website. None of the parties felt the need to redact ‘confidential material’ when they published the transcripts to various recipients. The recordings and transcripts had been previously disclosed to the court and to the Board of Regents in court action. They were already public information. The Board fired Burton for her husband publishing public information. That’s a violation of the First Amendment. >>

b. Engaging in disrespectful, harassing and intimidating behavior directed at her colleagues in an attempt to undermine them professionally and damage their reputations and careers, which seriously harmed the function of the Criminal Justice Department and created a department environment that was chilling and dysfunctional; and

Nobody cited what exactly was disrespectful, harassing, and intimidating in the emails. The allegations were unsupported. Speaking the truth about corrupt behavior may certainly be problematic for the person who engages in the corruption but one mustn’t punish the messenger. What the heck do they claim Burton “did?” They are keeping everything very vague and non committal so they can change their story later.

Disregarding the letter of direction issued by Dean Throop, which advised Dr. Burton not to involve students in her personal disputes and grievances, which negatively affected the learning environment and undermined the university' s ability to recruit and retain students in the Criminal Justice Department.

Dr. Burton asserts that she did not “disregard the letter of direction issued by Dean Throop.” Instead she actively attempted to address its incredibly unreasonable false and bogus allegations and directions. Dr. Burton asserts that she did not involve students in her personal disputes. The Roter Report did not produce any evidence that Dr. Burton did so. Former students who took Dr. Burton’s seminar class signed letters stating that Dr. Burton did not talk about her case in class but that they learned about the litigation from a mass email that the Chancellor’s office sent out. Chancellor Shields blamed Dr.Burton for something he did himself! The rigged appeals panel at UWP ignored the evidence Dr. Burton provided and found her guilty on an unsubstantiated claim.

16. On April 19, 2017, Dr. Burton submitted a request for an appeal hearing via-email to

<< She submitted the request to the faculty senate because that is what Chancellor Shields told her to do. He issued her false guidelines to later justify why Dr. Anderson seated the appeals panel in violation of policy. Shields and Lattis withheld the correct appeals procedures from Dr. Burton even after she for them repeatedly. Dr. Anderson became inappropriately involved in the appeal process and pulled Dr. Peckham’s puppet strings for the Chancellor. >>

17. The Faculty Hearing Panel ("Panel") acts as the Board's hearing agent in a dismissal proceeding. UWS 4.03. Hearings on the appeal were held on May 25, 2017^[1], September 19, 2017, and November 30, 2017.

<< The hearings were a mere ceremony, set up to give the false appearance of a fair process.

Dr. Burton contends that the appeal process provided by UWP was neither full nor fair opportunity for her to appeal the charges against her. The process was not held in accordance with UWP policy and it was not held in accordance with UWS 4. The courts have been clear that this must be done. “When published rules and regulations establish a particular statutory procedure for the termination of a teacher's employment, they may add to the constitutional minimum. If they do, such regulations must also be followed.” [Ferguson v Thomas, 430 F.2d 852 (1970)] and:

“The substance of due process requires that no instructor who has an expectancy of continued employment be deprived of that expectancy by mere ceremonial compliance with procedural due process.” [Ferguson v Thomas, 430 F.2d 852 (1970)] UWP provided nothing more than the appearance of an appeal hearing, a mere ceremony they attempt to pass off as due process.

Employers Mut. Liability Ins. Co. v. ILHR Dept., 214 NW 2d 587 - Wis: Supreme Court 1974 states “"[G]reat weight should be given to an administrative-agency interpretation and application of its own rules— unless plainly erroneous or inconsistent with the regulations so interpreted." So, we need to show that the administrative-agency interpretation and application of its own rules was “plainly erroneous and/or inconsistent with the regulations. We can do this easily. Use the terms “erroneous” and “inconsistent with regulations” in your arguments. IMPORTANT

18. During UW-Platteville's presentation of evidence, testimony on behalf of the University was presented by: Chancellor Shields; Interim Provost Throop; Dr. Staci Strobl (former chair); Dr. Cheryl Banachowski-Fuller (most senior faculty member); and Patrick Solar (Assistant professor and former police officer of 29 years). All witnesses described conduct that was disruptive and bullying and described the office as being unable to function with Burton present.

<< Here is a very IMPORTANT point: The Board uses testimony from 5-25-17 to fire Dr. Burton. But Dr. Burton was too sick to attend the hearing. The transcript shows that the panel was aware of Burton’s illness and proceeded with the hearing in her absence anyway. The Marder v. Board of Regents case demonstrates that it is a violation of constitutional law for new testimony to be given without the appellant present. This is cut and dry violation of Burton’s constitutional rights. She wasn’t present and she wasn’t allowed to cross-examine these people. IMPORTANT

Corrections: Strobl is acting chair of the CJ program and in a full administrative position; Banachowski-Fuller is the Director of the online program and in a full administrative position. She has not taught in the on campus CJ program for at least a decade. Patrick Solar was a police chief of a small (5 officers) Illinois police department and a long time administrator.

Questionable credibility: a. None of the witnesses were sworn in. b. The witnesses were not sequestered. C. Burton had complaints against each of the witnesses that were never investigated by the administration. d. They all told at least one verifiably false statement. We do have one count of perjury and submitted a sworn notice of claim to the AG office in July. Potential supporters of Dr. Burton had all been terminated over the course of the past six years or intimidated to keep a distance from Burton (according to a textmessage account of one of Burton’s former colleagues). The administration’s behavior is consistent with the pattern of a corrupt organization.

Witnesses were not sworn to honesty or truth at any of the hearings. They did not make any oath or affirmation of truth. However, the witnesses at the Chris Henige hearings were sworn in. This is unequal treatment of two similarly situated employees who were terminated using very different procedures and standard of proof and standard of truthfulness.

<< Of course, everyone who hadn’t yet been fired is afraid of the administration. The appeal panel did not allow for time to present witnesses and made it extremely difficult for Burton to gather support. She was banned from campus, closed out of her email account with the contact information to colleagues; there was a ‘gag order; in place as one former colleague stated; Burton supporters were fired or physically/emotionally intimidated (according to a witness’ account Burton’s mentor was cornered and yelled at by the CJ chair. He was forced out of the program.

Burton called Steve Elmer as a witness on her behalf (Burton-Witness-List-9-14-17). 7777 But he was fired before he had a chance to testify (Elmer-fired-pg1-2). 7777 He was fired the day before Burton’s final hearing. Elmer explained that the reasons for his termination were pretextual. It seems the administration removed him, so he wouldn’t be able to support Sabina and as an example to anyone else who supports her.

<< The panel was hand-picked by Dr. Anderson, an administrator, for Chancellor Shields in violation of policy. There are many credibility issues with the panel that are discussed elsewhere. The panel’s decision is void for many reasons including violation of Dr. Burton’s constitutional rights. >>

21. The Panel found that Dr. Burton publicly disclosed confidential personnel information of colleagues, which constituted a breach of trust and violated the reasonable expectations of UW-Platteville for its faculty.

<< . This “reasonable expectation” was not part of policy and was never communicated to Dr. Burton or the department prior to the statement of charges in writing or verbally. The chancellor and hearing panel held Burton to a standard that applied to nobody else. Just to her. That’s disparate treatment. She didn’t even know of the standard. The standard violated Wisconsin Open meetings Law, the Whistleblower law and Title VII. The Chancellor had mandated communication training for the department but that training was never conducted. The mandatory communication training would have been an opportunity to disseminate such a “reasonable expectation” but that training never was conducted. Burton asked repeatedly for the training to be conducted but she was ignored. >>

a. During the hearing, Dr. Burton admitted to intentionally recording conversations related to personnel decisions and evaluations.

<< Incorrect. Dr. Burton admitted to audio recording open meetings to gather evidence of corruption and cover up of sexual harassment and retaliation (cite transcript of 11-3017 hearing). Dr. Burton was slapped to keep her quiet. She was kicked to keep her quiet. She was shushed. She recorded open meetings to show that she was retaliated against.

Note: the Board does not say that these discussions were “confidential.” There is no “expectation” that all conversations related to personnel decisions and evaluations should not be recorded. If I told someone that my cousin’s boss decided to promote him based on his outstanding evaluations” and that person audio recorded me. Would that be worthy of termination? No. So, we simply ask the defense to please identify exactly which statement(s) in any audio recording was “confidential.” They can’t identify any specific statement because any specifics they give is problematic for them. They have to keep it all very vague.

Who determined those discussions to be “confidential” or worthy of being fired over? The Chancellor. He has a stake in this.

The Chancellor Stated in the hearing of 9-19-17 that he did not consider Burton’s recording the meetings to be a problem, but only the publication of them on the internet. Yet, he too published the transcripts of the 3 audios of the DRB/CRST meetings. Yet, the hearing panel seems to have vaguely found problems with the act recording and so the board seems, vaguely, to identify the act of recording as a problem. Hmm.

Wisconsin Open Meetings Law requires that anyone who desires to record open meetings shall be accommodated. All meetings she recorded were open. Other members of the administration published the audios and transcripts, unredacted. Many other reasons why this is problematic for the Board. (See rebuttal to Statement of charges.) >>

b. Dr. Burton knowingly violated reasonable expectations of privacy associated with sensitive personnel discussions held at department meetings. << False. Dr. Burton was never informed of any such “reasonable expectation” so she couldn’t have “known” of them. Dr. Burton is protected by whistleblower law. The meetings were open. There were no instructions given that indicated the content of the meeting was confidential. The Chancellor, Provost and Dean were themselves not concerned with the ‘confidential’ content as they published the same information without redaction during the open meeting appeal hearings. Dr. Burton is unfairly and illegally singled out. The Chancellor had mandated communication training that was never conducted. There are many other reasons why this is untrue and misleading (see rebuttal to Stmt of charges). >>

She provided such recordings to Mr. Burton, who she knew would publish the information publicly on-line.

<< False. Dr. Burton did not know that her husband was publishing those hearings and transcripts on his website. Mr. Burton published the hearings & partial transcripts as he believed them to be of public concern. So what if the audios were published. They had already been published by the court. >>

c. The expectation of privacy in the faculty appointment and tenure review process is standard practice in the university setting, including at UW-Platteville.^[2]

<< False. This “expectation of privacy” is not written in any law or policy. Nobody gave any proof that an expectation of privacy was communicated in any form at UW-Platteville. The chair of the meetings bared the responsibility to protect any expectation of privacy. The chair didn’t do that, so the chair of the meetings should be disciplined if anyone. None of the meetings were closed or included a verbal instruction. Dr. Burton was treated disparately. This is pretext for retaliation. In contrast see the Marder case (Decision-Marder-6-28-2001) states “You have knowingly disseminated confidential and misleading information about members of the University faculty and staff contrary to the expectations of UW-Superior has of its faculty and further in a manner inconsistent with section 3.12(A) and/or 3.12(C).” But Dr. Burton didn’t do anything inconsistent with any section of any rule of the faculty. It seems that the administration is trying to fit Burton’s case into a neat Marder case mold. It doesn’t fit because Marder violated section 3.12(A) and/or 3.12(C) but Burton didn’t violate any express rule. They fired her because she violated Chancellor Shields’ made up, unwritten and uncommunicated “standard of trust” that nobody else was ever held to. >>

22. The Panel found that Dr. Burton engaged in ongoing unprofessional behavior that significantly harmed the functioning of the Criminal Justice Department and that this behavior perpetuated and enhanced the dysfunctional work atmosphere and impaired the efficient and effective operation of the workplace. The Panel partially based its finding on the following:

<< The panel was a kangaroo court. It repeatedly violated Dr. Burton’s due process and ADA rights. It didn’t give Dr. Burton time to defend herself. It didn’t ask the administration for proof of their allegation but instead accepted the statements as facts. This is evidence that the Board relied on the findings of the hearing panel in its decision. So, we target the illegitimacy of the hearing panel to dismantle this decision. >>

a. Dr. Burton's behavior continued for years even though those involved in the 2012 Gibson faculty/student incident were no longer in the department and she had received two letters of direction admonishing her for such behavior.

<< Corrections: It is a false statement that those involved in the 2012 incident were no longer in the department. Gibson & Caywood left the school in 2015. Both were elevated or received compensation after the incident. Throop, who was ‘admonished’ by the 2013 grievance panel refused to repair Dr. Burton’s damaged reputation and was promoted to Provost. She left the school in 2017 for another position in Virginia. The Chancellor and his attorney who ordered the 2013 grievance panel to re-deliberate with excluding main parts of Burton’s grievance is still employed at UWP. The Chancellor and Throop were involved in the 2012 Gibson faculty/student incident and subsequent violations of policy and law that affected Burton.

The Board punishes Dr. Burton for speaking up against the ongoing retaliation and discrimination in the years following the Gibson incident. The Board did not address the severe violations of due process and UWP policy where they did not grant Burton grievance hearings or investigations into her allegations. Letters of directions were issued without giving Dr. Burton an opportunity to challenge them. She repeatedly asked to defend herself against the Letters of Direction that alleged acts she did not commit or that were protected by law >>

b. Over the period from 2012, when troubles began, to 2016, three different department chairs, two deans and the chancellor offered informal conversation with Dr. Burton in an attempt to resolve disputes.

<< This claim is unsubstantiated and false. Dr. Caywood refused a mediation in spring 2013 that HR Director tried to set up . (exhibit EZZZU) 7777 March 22, 2013 12:39 pm – Burton received an email from Jeanne Durr informing her that Dr. Caywood had not responded to her multiple requests to schedule mediation. Burton informed her that she had initiated grievance procedures. When Dr. Burton tried to discuss her problems with the interim chair Dr. Dalecki he stated that he had been advised by counsel not to talk to Burton (exhibit 635) 10/2/2014 7:49 PM.7777 Chair Dr. Strobl was likewise advised by UW legal counsel not to discuss anything with Burton (hearing transcript of 5-25-17). The Chancellor ignored Burton’s attempts to meet with him Fri, Aug 09, 2013 07:38 AM (exhibit EZZZZZJ-1), MtgRqst-11-9-16-ignored 7777 , . Dr. Dalecki tried to pressure Dr. Burton to abandon her legal claim against the school. Burton’s attempt to communicate were repeatedly met with a cold shoulder and icy silence. >>

Despite such efforts, disparaging remarks through e-mail and social media were made by Dr. Burton directed to or about colleagues.

<< The remarks by Dr. Burton were reasonable and professional. The administration provided only The quantity and ferocity of Dr. Burton’s emails were exaggerated wildly. The Chancellor did not provide e-mails or social media remarks that were disparaging. Dr. Burton followed Throop’s 2014 Directive to address her problems with colleagues at the most local level. When she did exactly that and tried to address concerns Throop and Shields claimed she was acted inappropriately. The emails in the record do not amount to a problem in a collegial setting. A fair evaluation of the emails would demonstrate this. It appears Throop and UWS Legal set Dr. Burton up. I compiled a list of all the emails Sabina sent that the Board used as basis to fire her: (Burton-emails-used-to-fire-her.xlsx) – Saved as pdf and word files (Burton-emails-used-to-fire-her.docx), (Burton-emails-used-to-fire-her.pdf). Also saved as web page (Burton-emails-used-to-fire-her.htm). >>

c. As a result of Dr. Burton's behavior, the department could not openly engage in conversation and was unable to address even routine issues for fear of reprisals.

<< This is insane and absolutely untrue. Her recordings show just the opposite and therefore support the claim the recordings were made in accordance of the Whistleblower statute. The recordings prove that Dr. Burton was shushed, slapped, verbally attacked at meetings. The department members and administrators were not at all hindered and openly engaged in conversation and retaliation. >>

d. Dr. Burton ignored two letters of direction issued approximately 20 months apart (October 28, 2014 by Dean Throop, and June 3, 2016 by Chancellor Shields) that specifically instructed her to treat her colleagues with respect and to refrain from harassing behavior. Both letters warned Dr. Burton that additional disciplinary action could ensue if the directions were ignored.

<< The LODs were designed merely to provide documentation that the administration could later point to as evidence to fire Dr. Burton. She asked for grievance hearings to address the unacceptable nature of the Throop LOD but her due process rights were violated. She was not given a hearing as required. Fake procedures were written after Dr. Burton asked to address the LOD in a grievance hearing to prevent her from addressing the matter. Both letters were based on fabrications and bogus reasoning. They are shells of evidence that will crumble if examined closely. >>

e. Dr. Burton alleged that she did not harass or intimidate any, but the Panel found the record to overwhelmingly demonstrate that this sentiment was untrue. Moreover, the Panel found Dr. Burton's lack of remorse or recognition for how others interpret her communications to be unacceptable for any faculty member, much less a tenured faculty member.

<< The panel was chosen by Chancellor Shields’ agent, Dr. Anderson, in violation of policy, to provide this sort of finding. The panel withheld evidence Dr. Burton provided to them from the Board. The panel did not allow Dr. Burton to properly address the charges by limiting her time and did not let her cross-examine the witnesses. They violated her constitutional rights by conducting a hearing without her being present. They violated numerous procedural requirements, state, federal and constitutional laws as well as university policy and UW System policy. There seems to be no end to their propensity to violate rules.>>

23. The Panel did not find evidentiary support to find that Dr. Burton had violated the letter of direction by involving students in her personnel disputes and grievances. << Yet Throop charged her with that violation, Chancellor Shields stated Throop’s charge had merit and added it to his charges of dismissal despite the fact that his investigator didn’t find any wrong-doing. Any reasonable panel would have found that suspicious. Shields lied. Also, the Board put in their decision that Burton violated the lod in this way. They didn’t even read the panel’s findings. >>

24. The Panel stated that the actions taken by Dr. Burton created an atmosphere of distrust and obstructed the department's day to day functioning. The Panel was also struck by the absence of testimony from even a single department member or other individual from the university who supported Dr. Burton's retention and concluded that returning her to the department would negatively affect the functioning of the department and university.

<< The panel found what the Chancellor and Attorney Lattis told them to find. They are completely incredible. They were hand-picked by Chancellor Shields through Dr. Anderson.

Chair Strobl resigned in Nov. 2016, 2 days after the Chancellor’s office cancelled a forum Strobl called just 30 minutes prior to its scheduled time. Strobl cited a “lack of institutional support” and stayed away from campus for the reminder of the semester. The CJ department carried out its responsibilities to the students without interruption. All classes were held, grades turned in, students were properly advised. There is no record of the department not being able to function due to anything Burton did. Upon information and belief, Strobl has been placed on mandatory leave. This is a sign that the dysfunction has not been resolved by removing Burton.

Dr. Burton gave the panel a list of potential witnesses on her behalf. Two of them left the department in the midst of the semester. One was fired: Steve Elmer, who alleges discrimination by disability. The other one was, according to a witness, cornered and yelled at by Chair Strobl: Joe Lomax. Ava Phipps also left the department and described to Dr. Burton in a text-message a dysfunctional department that pressured everyone to cut ties to Dr. Burton. Burton’s witnesses were targeted and harassed. Anyone who supported Burton was targeted. They were afraid to testify. They were not necessary anyway. Burton has compiled plenty of evidence to support her case without verbal testimony of friendly witnesses. Instead she relies on solid written evidence and audio recordings. They cannot be intimidated by a corrupt administration.

25. The Panel found clear and convincing evidence to establish just cause for dismissal by a vote of 5-0.

The Board of Regents used a standard of Preponderance of the Evidence. So, there is no clear standard. What is it supposed to be? Does anyone know? The standard was certainly never communicated to Burton.

26. In correspondence dated February 16, 2018, Chancellor Dennis Shields wrote a letter to President Cross recommending the termination of Dr. Burton for just cause based on the two violations found by the Panel. Chancellor Shield's letter did not seek dismissal based on the issue related to involving students in personnel issues.

<< The Board is vague here. The only 2 charges left are Dr. Burton’s exercise of Academic Freedom and acting as a Whistleblower. The Board appears to charge Dr. Burton for an act of her husband that he did so as a concerned citizen and parent of a UWP student. >>

ISSUE

The ultimate issue presented to the Board of Regents is whether, based on the record, there is just cause for Dr. Burton's dismissal from her tenured faculty position.

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW << Henige says this is where to focus attention. I agree. Sabina can work on putting together the Notices of Claim and I’ll work on this stuff. >>

1. Dr. Burton has been afforded the due process and procedural guarantees required by

She was not present at the hearing on 5-25-17. According to the Marder Supreme court decision, this is a constitutional law violation.

The Chancellor issued fake procedures so he could set up his kangaroo court. Etc.

2. Just cause for the dismissal of Dr. Burton from her position as a full professor in the UWPlatteville Department of Criminal Justice has been established by a clear preponderance of the evidence. See Safransky v. Personnel Board, 62 Wis. 2d 464, 215 N.W.2d 379

<< The hearing panel was given instruction on just cause by Shields and Lattis that was a misinterpretation of law. See hearing transcripts. Kasieta spoke to it on about page 12 of the 9-19-17 hearing.

The hearing panel claimed that their standard of proof was clear and convincing evidence and here the board claims “a clear preponderance of the evidence.” The statutes and policies do not spell out what the burden of proof is for such cases. The Board seems to be going for a lower burden “preponderance of evidence” and making it seem to be a stronger standard by throwing in the word “clear.” This seems to be a word trick that should produce an interesting discussion. What is the administration’s burden of proof? Can they just act on the Chancellor’s say so? Is that all they need to justify a decision to fire a tenured faculty member?

Clear preponderance of evidence is not the standard to be enforced here. The hearing panel used clear and convincing evidence as their standard and the Board used a completely different standard. Dr. Burton presented arguments with the understanding that the standard was “clear and convincing evidence.” The standard was changed without warning. If Dr. Burton had known the standard was to be a “clear preponderance of evidence” she would could have formulated her arguments to that standard, assuming she had a definition of that standard. She therefore was at a disadvantage by not knowing the standard the board would use. She pointed out to the hearing panel that the standard was “clear and convincing evidence” (transcript). She pointed out to the Board’s committee the same thing (audio of hearing). But the board did not inform Dr. Burton that her expectation of the standard was different than the standard the Board would use. There is no indication in UWS 4 that states what the standard is. However, there are indications that the standard is “clear and convincing evidence.” So, the Board seems to have used the wrong standard of proof.

DISCUSSION

The evidence supports the Chancellor's assertion Dr. Burton shared personnel information of colleagues which breached the trust and reasonable expectations of UW-Platteville for its faculty. While there is no assertion that Dr. Burton violated the law, it is reasonable to expect that personnel discussions, particularly regarding junior faculty members, will not be recorded and posted publicly on the internet. <<So many problems with this. They seem to be saying that it is ok to publish them in a complaint against a faculty member but not to publish them on the internet. They also imply that Dr. Burton published them on the internet which she didn’t. They seem to believe that Dr. Burton knew what her husband would publish. She didn’t.

· The meeting chairs had an obligation to establish those “expectations” by closing the meetings.

· The administration had an obligation to establish those “expectations” by creating policy to deal with recordings. They didn’t.

· The audios had already been published to the court and to the Board. Disciplining Burton for publishing this public information violates the Whistleblower law and Burton’s constitutional right of Free Speech.

The Board finds that Chancellor Shields has the inherent authority to expect that personnel matters will be kept confidential.

<< Then he should require his employees to follow Wisconsin Open Meetings Law and close meeting, not fire someone who audio records open meetings.. He should conduct the communication training he mandated and explain these things to the faculty members.

Attorney Lattis couldn’t even explain to the Board of Regents how the Wisconsin Open Meetings Law works. She said “it’s complicated” to avoid agreeing with Burton that the meetings were all “open.” If even the senior legal counsel for the System can’t understand how the open meetings law works how can the Board hold Burton to following an expectation that isn’t even written down?

The university has been very lax in confidentiality matters. For example Lattis published a letter by a student without redacting the student’s name. Former Chair Caywood admitted that records were kept in the mailroom, easily accessible to anyone in the department including students. Caywood further admitted that he took confidential hiring records to his home after he no longer was chair of the department. Meetings were never closed for confidentiality purposes. Graded student papers were left unattended and accessible to anyone in the hallways. Other confidential material was left in a basket at the reception desk even after business hours. Yet Dr. Burton was singled out for the harshest discipline possible while no one else even faced a reprimand. Not to mention that Dr. Burton had good reasons to make the recordings as a whistleblower. This is disparate treatment and pretext for retaliation. There are many reasons why this is wrong. >>

The evidence supports the Chancellor's assertion that Dr. Burton engaged in intimidating, harassing, and disruptive conduct. Dr. Burton began engaging in abusive, intimidating, and disruptive conduct against her colleagues in 2012. She was counseled to cease engaging in the behavior and received two letters of direction.

The record does not indicate that Dr. Burton was counseled to cease engaging in intimidating, harassing or disruptive conduct. She only got the written letters. No counseling whatsoever. Where did this come from? It is not true. This is a fraudulent statement. When she asked for mediation she was refused. Her direct superiors were instructed by UWS Legal Counsel Lattis not to talk to her. Nobody was willing to discuss the LODs with her and hear her side of the story. Directives given to Dr. Burton were either vague or in direct violation of her state and federal rights. Note: This decision brings the Throop LOD into the current lawsuit. We can now claim that the damages are a result of the administration’s failure to provide a grievance hearing so Dr. Burton could address the fraudulent nature of the LODs.

· Dr. Burton asked to talk to Dr. Dalecki and he refused (Dkt-53-13--31634) 7777

· Dr. Strobl stated at the hearing of 5-25-17 “ I was entering a department where somebody was currently involved in legal action against the university, you and I met, Attorney Lattis, and that was in 2015, it would have been August or September, and spoke about the issue because there was an ongoing litigation. You had advised me not to engage with her in any details or any content that had to do with the lawsuit generally speaking, and that in fact if something like that came up, I was to alert then Dean Throop or you and you would take care of it. So I was coming in as supervising somebody for which some aspects of what they might talk to me about, I could not talk to them about, which is a unique situation.” (Transcript-5-25-17-Hearing - pg 67). So, clearly Dr. Strobl did not “counsel” Dr. Burton.

The Board uses the words “intimidating, harassing, abusive and disruptive” without associating them with any actions by Dr. Burton. What did Dr. Burton “do?” She helped a student victim of sexual harassment. She recorded open meetings to protect herself. She asked for investigations. She complained of retaliation. She pointed out violations of law and policy. These are the acts for which she was fired. These acts are protected by law. These acts can certainly be considered “intimidating, harassing, abusive and disruptive” by criminals in a corrupt organization, but they do not disrupt good, honest operations. These acts are good for society.

Dr. Burton was repeatedly instructed that continuing misconduct would result in additional discipline. Burton never demonstrated that she understood how disruptive and harmful her behavior was and never ceased engaging in such behavior. Several witnesses testified that her behavior made conducting departmental business nearly impossible.

<< What additional discipline? There was no progressive discipline. Burton was never given opportunity to address the false charges against her.

The witnesses were allowed to talk wildly outside the scope of charges. They lied about facts (cite transcript of 5-25-17 hearing). None of the witnesses were credible as Dr. Burton had complained of retaliation by all of them. They all had reason to retaliate against Dr. Burton. The environment of a corrupt university encourages and enables these sorts of people to tell lies to get rid of “targeted employees.” >>

Also, the fact that Dr. Burton received two raises and tenure following the Gibson incident undercuts any notions of retaliation.

<< False. Dr. Burton received one inequity adjustment which did not bring her to parity with Dr. Solar’s pay, a junior faculty member. There seems to have been one other small pay increase that was given to every employee of the UW System. Dr. Burton’s tenure bid was first opposed by former Chair Caywood who tried to rally support in denying her tenure. The Chancellor’s office “overlooked” the tenure recommendation by the CJ Dept committee while giving tenure to Burton’s junior colleague Mr. Dutelle, who was hired one year after Burton and did not have a Ph.D. So, when examined closely, the only reasons Burton was given tenure was 1) because the administration had already given tenure to a less deserving faculty member and they could not deny Burton tenure without giving her evidence by which to win a lawsuit and 2) because the administration knows that they can fire any tenured faculty member they want, any time they want, by violating the rules. They gave Burton tenure, but tenure does not protect her when the administration violates the tenure protection rules. Tenure within the UW System is meaningless. It provides targeted professors only a bit more ceremony but no protection.

The fact that Dr. Burton was given these pay increases and tenure does not undercut the notion of retaliation. It merely shows that the administration chose to retaliate in other ways. The court seems to readily accept retaliation by pay but it is easier for an employer to hide retaliation by other means. One should also address here that institutions have learned to mitigate retaliation claims by providing some form of gratuity to give the appearance of fair treatment. They no longer make the same mistakes that cost administrators lawsuits in the past. >>

The University is a place of teaching and learning. To fulfill its mission, the University, like any other place of business or government, relies on its staff to behave in a professional and appropriate manner. The Board will not tolerate the type of incivility exhibited by Dr. Burton toward her colleagues.

<< The Board has been lied to. Dr. Burton’s actions have been civil and appropriate. The Board ignored the evidence that was provided to them in the briefs. The board does not tolerate fair treatment of employees.

Here is a quote from the web page: https://www.wisconsin.edu/regents/policies/commitment-to-academic-freedom-and-freedom-of-expression/ ( this webpage was cited in the McAdam’s case): “But it is not the proper role of the university to attempt to shield individuals from ideas and opinions they, or others, find unwelcome, disagreeable, or even deeply offensive. Although the university greatly values civility, concerns about civility and mutual respect can never be used as justification for closing off discussion of ideas, however offensive or disagreeable those ideas may be to some members within the university community. The freedom to debate and discuss the merits of competing ideas does not mean that members of the university community may say whatever they wish, wherever they wish. Consistent with longstanding practice informed by law, institutions within the System may restrict expression that violates the law, that falsely defames a specific individual, that constitutes a genuine threat or discriminatory harassment, that unjustifiably invades substantial privacy or confidentiality interests, or that is otherwise directly incompatible with the functioning of the university. In addition, the institutions may reasonably regulate the time, place, and manner of expression to ensure that it does not disrupt ordinary activities. But these are narrow exceptions to the general principle of freedom of expression, and it is vitally important that these exceptions never be used in a manner that is inconsistent with each institution’s commitment to a completely free and open discussion of ideas.”

The administration never even asked Burton to take down the audio recordings from the website. Never. They didn’t attempt to “restrict her expression.” They just wanted to get rid of her and they used her husband’s website as reason to do so.

The meetings Burton recorded were open meetings. Firing her for recording and publishing these recordings is inconsistent with the institution’s commitment to open discussion.

The audios Burton recorded were justifiable. They do not substantially invade anyone’s privacy or confidentiality interests. None of the people in the meetings and none of the people who may have been discussed in the meetings ever complained about the recordings or their publication. Burton made no genuine threat or discriminatory harassment. They can’t even say what she did to warrant being fired. They fired her for what other people did.

Testimony provided by witnesses at the hearing before the Hearing Panel demonstrate that Dr. Burton's behaviors meet and exceed the Safransky test for just cause.

<< The testimony was false. Dr. Burton’s due process rights were violated repeatedly. The Board failed to search for truth but simply went along with what it was presented. It allowed Dr. Burton to be railroaded by Chancellor Shields and Attorney Lattis. The most likely explanation is that they are worried about liability and litigation. But that should not be a reason for them to fire a good professor. There is something seriously broken in this UW System. It seems to be in the Legal department. There is more than one test for just cause in the Safransky standard and the evidence does not rise to any of them. The Board applied only one of the tests. The Safransky standard is whack anyway. It does not apply. It is a standard for untenured employees and it is used to justify getting rid of anyone they want to get rid of. >>

Her mistreatment of colleagues impaired the ability of her department to pursue its mission and serve its students.

<< Again, Dr. Burton didn’t mistreat anyone. Sigh. The department was not impaired by Burton. It was impaired by corruption. What may have been an interruption was the abrupt resigning of Chair Strobl who refused to come on campus for the reminder of the fall semester. Nonetheless Strobl was paid full chair salary for the rest of fall 2016. Why wasn’t Strobl fired for resigning and leaving the department to fend for itself? Double standard. Strobl disrupted the department. Shields disrupted the university by sending an email to all the students with legal documents. >>

Department members could not engage in even the most minor of academic business with Burton without fear of coming under her constant drumbeat of accusations. << Good grief. This is just insanity. Dr. Burton only accused people of violating the rules when they violated the rules. Maybe if they would start following the rules she wouldn’t need to do so. The problem is that the administration failed to properly process her allegations. They denied her due process. When someone is railroaded they may complain. That’s what happened. Sabina was mistreated so she complained about it. The drumbeat was the pounding that the administration gave Burton.

This shows that Burton accused members of the department and that is what they fired her for. But academic freedom protects that speech. The agency has not shown any of Burton’s allegations to be false. None of her accusations were untrue. The Board did not find that anything Burton stated was untrue.

“But it is not the proper role of the university to attempt to shield individuals from ideas and opinions they, or others, find unwelcome, disagreeable, or even deeply offensive. Although the university greatly values civility, concerns about civility and mutual respect can never be used as justification for closing off discussion of ideas, however offensive or disagreeable those ideas may be to some members within the university community. “ Board of Regents policy statement: https://www.wisconsin.edu/regents/policies/commitment-to-academic-freedom-and-freedom-of-expression/

The Board also rejects Burton's assertions that she had a right grounded in the First Amendment and the general concept of academic freedom to demean and denigrate her colleagues.

Board of Regents policy statement says “Although the university greatly values civility, concerns about civility and mutual respect can never be used as justification for closing off discussion of ideas, however offensive or disagreeable those ideas may be to some members within the university community. “

Dr. Burton never asserted that she has a right to demean or denigrate her colleagues. This is ridiculous. She has a right to point out issues of public concern and that is what she did. This statement sounds like Attorney Lattis wrote it. Absurd. - Burton’s communications were definitely protected by the First Amendment and Academic Freedom because her communications were not to demean and denigrate her colleagues but to expose corruption, to give voice to the vulnerable victims of sexual abuse and to complain of severe retaliation against herself. These are all protected.

The Roter report says “It is also clear that Dr. Burton’s mission to expose corruption has made a variety of institutional issues public… it is clear that it has pulled students into matters and conflicts that inappropriate and outside the scope of the academic mission/environmment [sic].” So, this statement identifies Burton’s “behavior” as a “mission to expose corruption” that made issues public that pulled students into matters. This statement shows that Burton’s published materials were of public concern. The author of the investigation report clearly believed that Burton’s speech was of public concern. Why else would it have drawn students into the matter? It shows that the matters Burton discussed were “institutional matters and not matters of her own private concern.”

In the McAdam’s cast the Supreme court wrote that the constitution protects adademic expression that touches on matters of public concern – including that a university cannot take adverse employment action against such a speaker unless its interest in promoting workplace efficiency both outweights the employee’s considerable free-speech interests “and required nothing less than the particular adverse employment action that it undertook.” It is clear that the administration could easily have 1) asked Burton to take down the website 2) suspended Burton for a period of time 3) demoted her etc. They could have done a number of things short of firing her but they never disciplined her. They wanted her gone and that’s what happened. This statement fits perfectly. Even if the court agrees that Burton’s actions were disruptive and they further agree that her disruption to business outweighed her First Amendment rights the defense still needs to prove that there was nothing else the administration could have done that was a lesser form of punishment. They can’t do that. Cite the argument by Kasieta in the hearing as he touches on this with Shields.

The emails that the Board fired Burton for writing are in the state court record. Take a look at what she was fired for having written. Did her words disrupt? Yes. Were her words covered by academic freedom protection? Absolutely! Make sure they all get into the federal court too. Discovery question: “What exactly, did Burton write that “demeaned and denigrated her colleagues?” Have them put it in writing.

Neither the First Amendment nor academic freedom have ever been interpreted to prohibit a public university from restraining uncivil speech that disrupts the workplace.

<< Agreed. But that doesn’t apply here because Dr. Burton did not make uncivil speech that disrupts the workplace.

No one in the entire process has pointed out which speech was uncivil. The Chancellor’s dismissal package included benign emails from Burton in which she responded to her chair’s question how many interns she wanted “just my fair share.” The assertion that Dr. Burton was un-collegial is pretext. Dr. Burton’s actions and communications were exaggerated to a profoundly absurd extent.

The courts have long recognized that a public employee's interest in free expression may be outweighed by the public employer's need to effectively perform its mission. See Waters v. Churchill, 511 U.S. 661, 668 (1994). Dr. Burton's speech crossed that boundary.

<< This statement misses the whole point. Waters v. Churchill is not on point. Auschwitz was run very efficiently. Demers v. Austin, is a more applicable argument - Sabina’s statements were in the public interest.

Also, whistleblower law. The communications sent by Burton were constitutionally protected under the First Amendment, Demers v. Austin (746 F.3d 402 (9th Cir. 2014). The administration just grabbed whatever they could to fire Burton and did so. In the process they violated numerous state, federal and constitutional laws as well as policies.

Dr. Burton alleges that six student records were submitted to the Panel, but that only two were included in the record. Even if true, this is a legally harmless error. Student support is not at issue in this proceeding, but rather Dr. Burton's conduct directed towards her colleagues.

<< The former students stated in their signed letters that Dr. Burton never talked about her case in class and that they learned about her case from emails sent out by the administration. The problem here is that Dr. Burton complained that there were thousands of other pages missing from the record as well. The Board glosses over the true argument, that the Board failed to include Burton’s evidence in the record. For example, they excluded Burton’s rebuttal to the Chancellor’s statement of charges. There can be no more material document in the record. But they excluded it. The student letters are not terribly significant. Burton’s rebuttals are very significant and relevant and material.>>

Dr. Burton alleges that the Roter Investigation Report is fraudulent because it was not signed. She cites no evidence to support this allegation. << This is absurd. Dr. Burton alleges that the Roter investigation report is fraudulent because it contains false statements of fact, biased opinion and omits material facts, not because it is unsigned. See Wis. Stat. 943.39. Evidence and arguments describing this was provided to the hearing panel, but the panel failed to provide the materials to the board. The document is clearly not signed. The fact that it is unsigned is evidence that the report may not have been written by Dr. Roter. It indicates that the report may be a forgery (see Wis. Stat. 943.38) Dr. Burton provided evidence that another investigative report was “edited by a third person” to include false statements against Burton. Also, Lattis has shielded all of Dr. Burton’s attempts to communicate with Dr. Roter about the report. Dr. Roter practically ‘disappeared from this earth.’ The report is definitely fraudulent. It is very very likely also a forgery. Evidence indicates that Attorney Lattis or Chancellor Shields altered the original Roter report. The Board violated Wis. Stat. 227.45(5) by failing to produce the original when requested. >>

The Panel accepted the report into the record and administration indicated that they received it from Dr. Roter electronically and unsigned. There is no reason to believe that the report was fraudulent. << There are a lot of reasons to believe the report is fraudulent and lots of reasons to believe it was forged (see Roter report rebuttal).. >>

Moreover, it was the first-hand testimony at the hearing the provided the basis for the Panel's recommendation, not the Roter investigation report.

<< Here is further proof that the Board relied on the testimony of the 5-25-17 hearing. The Marder case decision shows that it was a violation of Burton’s constitutional rights to conduct that hearing in her absence. So, there you have it. This is a very strong argument and a very strong case law. The Marder case law is one that the administration has pointed to in support of its positions on almost everything. Now it blows them out of the water. It proves that they violated Burton’s constitutional rights and UWS 4 by conducting the hearing without her present. IMPORTANT

The investigation report was used as basis for the Board’s decision. In this decision the investigation report is quoted often to provide evidence against Dr. Burton. Its validity is crucial to justice in this case. It is absurd to argue that the validity of the investigation report is not important because the hearing panel did not rely on it while at the same time quoting from it in the Board’s decision in support of dismissing Dr. Burton. This absurdity is evidence of pretext. Again, the first-hand testimony is not credible for a number of reasons (Hearing-5-25-17-Rebuttal). >>

UWS 4.03 requires the faculty of each institution to provide a "standing committee" charged with hearing dismissal cases and making recommendations." For reasons that are not completely clear, Dr. Burton asserted that the selection of the Panel was improper and asked for another panel to be convened.

** To understand this matter one must realize that Burton had been informed that the appeal process was controlled by UWS 4 and by UW P policy. However, UWP policy clearly says that UWS4 is the only procedures for dismissal proceedings for a tenured faculty member. So, Burton has been making the arguments all along that UW P procedures were being violated and each time she was ignored. After the last hearing it came clear that UW P procedures should not be used at all in the appeal process. However, the hearing panel stated at the beginning of each hearing that the process would be pursuant to both UWS 4 and UWP policy. So, it seems like the right way to do it is to only use UWS 4. So, we can either argue that the panel violated UWP policy by improperly forming the hearing panel or we can argue that they violated UWS 4 which does not provide for a reduction of the 9-member standing faculty committee to a 5-member hearing panel.

UW Platteville Faculty Bylaw 6.3.12.3 (Faculty_Personnel_Policies-Procedures-2017) 7777 provides procedures for formation of a nine-member Appeals Commission (Commission). Burton did not contest the formation of the nine-member Appeals Commission.

UW Platteville Faculty Bylaw requires that the Commission select a chair. The UW Platteville Commission selected two chairs.

UW Platteville Faculty Bylaw states that the nine-member Appeals Commission selects a five-member appeal hearing panel (Panel) to hear an appeal.

UW Platteville Faculty Bylaw states that the five-member Panel selects its own chair.

There is nothing in UW Platteville policy that allows the Faculty Senate Chair to select the members or the chair of the Panel.

Burton highlighted to the hearing panel the appeal procedures that had been identified to her as applicable (AppealRights-Highlights). 7777

Dr. Peckham, first chair of the Panel, sent a letter stating that Anderson appointed the appeal panel and its chair (Peckham-to-Amouyal-5-1-17). 7777

Respondents erroneously interpreted a provision of law, specifically UWS 4, by interpreting that this statute permitted them to use UW Platteville Faculty Personnel Policies and Procedures for the dismissal hearings. Respondents violated Burton’s due process rights by treating Burton unequally to another recent case of a tenured faculty member who was dismissed from another UW System campus, UW-Whitewater v. Henige, the same action for dismissal by the same agency under the same statutory guidelines. The hearing panel in that case did not use university level policy but used only UWS 4 to control their hearings 2 minute version: (Henige-video-justUWS4) – full version on my website: (UWW-Video-01-Opening), on Henige website: (UWW-Video-01-Opening). This was not available to the hearing panel so be sure to include it later in the record. The Respondent conducted the hearings under a different set of rules in Burton’s case than in that other case, which constitutes a violation of Petitioner’s right to equal treatment.

Hansen, second chair of the Panel, stated at the beginning of all three hearings: “This appeal will be conducted according to the policies and procedures set forth in Chapters UWS 4 and UW Platteville Faculty Handbook, Chapters 6.3.12.3 and 6.3.13.”

UW Platteville Faculty Personnel Policies and Procedures 6.3.13 Dismissals states “All procedures for dismissal for cause are set forth in UWS 4.” By conducting the hearings according to the policies and procedures set forth in UW Platteville Faculty Handbook, Chapter 6.3.12.3, the respondent violated UW Platteville Faculty Handbook, Chapter 6.3.13. IMPORTANT

Respondent also erred in the application of UW Platteville Faculty Handbook, Chapters 6.3.12.3

<< The reasons are clear because Dr. Burton sent an email explaining her reasons (ToAppealsCommission-5-21-17). Dr. Burton gave clear reasons to the hearing panel. Here it is in a clear and concise nutshell: Chancellor Shields withheld the procedures from Dr. Burton in violation of policy. Then he gave her fake procedures to follow, which she did. Those fake procedures caused her to send her request for hearing to the wrong person. That person selected the hearing panel in violation of policy. Dr. Anderson also selected the panel chairs. She did this by the authority vested in her by an entity that did not posess that authority. So, there were several violations of policy and maybe a felony in there too (fraudulent policy delivered with intent to deceive and extort). This is not hard to understand. The board’s statement echoes the hearing panel’s inability or unwillingness to understand Dr. Burton’s plain English assertion. The board could have asked this question in the Board’s hearing panel, but it did not. By claiming that Dr. Burton’s reasons are not clear, even after the panel made the same claim, the board admits that it did not search for truth.

UWS 4.04 says the request for a hearing “shall be addressed in writing to the chairperson of the standing faculty committee created under UWS 4.03” yet Shields told Burton to send her appeal to someone else (the Faculty Senate – chair -Dr. Anderson). Shields gave fake policy and withheld the real policy.

The entire 9-member Appeals Commission should have presided over the hearings, not just the 5-member panel selected by Dr. Anderson. UWS 4 does not allow for the reduction of the size of the panel but that is merely part of UW Platteville policy which is not applicable. (or shouldn’t be)

UWS 4.03 is pretty clear, the “standing faculty committee” is responsible for all of the things listed – all nine members of that “standing faculty committee;” not a subcommittee (that term is never used), not a “hearing panel” made up of a subgroup of those nine people (the term “panel” never appears anywhere either.) So, the Appeals Commission had no authority to reduce the 9-member Appeals Commission to only 5 members.

The 9-member “standing faculty committee” and the 5-member “appeal panel” are two different things, but because 4.03 says that “the standing faculty committee shall operate as the hearing agent for the board,” and they are responsible for “conducting the hearing.” The 5-member Appeal panel called itself the “Appeals Commission” in the transcripts of the hearings but they are not the standing faculty committee that was established by UWS 4.03. They are merely an inappropriately hand-picked sub-group of that committee.

Dr. Anderson, by inappropriate direction of Chancellor Shields, inappropriately used inapplicable policy to subdivide the 9-member standing faculty committee to a sub-unit of that committee in violation of UWS 4. They further used ambiguous terminology to hide their indiscretions in violation of legitimate policy and law. Burton’s appeal should have been heard by the 9-member standing faculty committee, but it was heard by an inappropriately appointed 5-member sub-unit of that committee. IMPORTANT

So let’s move on to the unequal treatment issue. At UWW, the actual hearing panel is, according to the rules, chosen randomly from a pool of 36 committee members. They simply take the top five people, and when they’ve served those names go to the bottom of the list. Over time people’s terms expire and things get shuffled so that the same people won’t ever end up on two panels. The purpose of this is to ensure impartiality, and if for some reason someone shows up in those five who is either in the home department of the accused or accuser, they get dropped, and the accused and the chancellor can nix one person for no reason. In Dr. Burton’s case, five people were chosen from a panel of nine, and were handpicked by the chair of the Faculty Senate, which can hardly be construed as “random”, and certainly could lead to “partiality.” Whether or not they were in fact partial is irrelevant – the processes for selection of a “jury of one’s peers” between UW Whitewater and UW Platteville differs and therefore constitutes unequal treatment.

Even if the Board argues that the universities are empowered to create their own rules, those rules must be the same on every campus, or else there is unequal treatment under the statutes. The statutes also cover the bases as far as the proceedings, and the statutes will always trump local rules. So, anything the Board’s hearing panel did that conflicts with the language of the statutes, such as establishing time limits when the statutes clearly state that “all” testimony must be admitted, is improper and subject to reversal.

The Faculty Senate Chair, and not the 9-member standing faculty committee, made the appointments to the hearing panel and the hearing panel chair. This is an “error in the interpretation of agency policy.” IMPORTANT

He says that the Faculty Senate Chair, under the authority of the Faculty Senate, appointed five members of the commission to a "special panel" and made Peckham chair. They kept using different terms to describe the panel "hearing panel" "special panel," "appeals panel," "appeal panel," "appeal commission," "Appeals Commission," etc. Burton never knew for sure who they were talking about exactly. This is clear: the 9-member standing faculty committee identified in UWS 4.03 did not select their own 5-member hearing panel and that 5-member hearing panel didn't select its own chair. The standing faculty committee called for by UWS 4.03 did not hear the appeal. An improperly appointed sub-unit of that committee, that was hand-picked by Dr. Anderson, heard the appeal and made the recommendation to the Board. That sub-unit did not have authority to conduct the appeal hearings. IMPORTANT

UW-Platteville followed its established procedures in assembling the panel where the faculty senate chair assigns members from the available pool of those willing to serve, and the resulting panel then chooses its chair.

<< This is a false statement. ((AppealPanelViolations). 7777). The established procedures do not include involvement of the faculty senate chair. This is just plain false. Where did they get this baloney? It seems like Lattis just told them this because she wanted them to sign the document. It will be easy to show that this is not true. >>

This process comports with UWPlatteville faculty adopted rules, and there is nothing in UWS 4.03 or its use of the term "standing" that imposes an election or appointment requirement.

<< There is nothing in the term “standing” that imposes any form of reduction of membership. The board is arguing that UWS 4.03 is the only guideline that applies but that guideline does not allow the 9-members to be reduced to five. . But the rules are clear that the university must follow its own policy if it is applicable. (Wis. Stat. 36.09(1)(f)). The UWP policy clearly indicate that the Appeals Commission selects the members of the appeal panel and then the appeal panel selects its own chair. The panel chair stated at the beginning of each hearing that the appeal was subject to UW Platteville policy. But they didn’t follow it. Now they vaguely seem to indicate that the only controlling rules are in UWS 4. Ridiculous. >>

Nor does that term require that committee membership and the chair be named ahead of time.

<< It is unclear why this statement is in the decision. Dr. Burton never said anything about this. This seems to be an attempt to distract the board from the real issue. >>

Also, when the first panel was selected Dr. Burton's objection to one of the panel members was accepted and that the initial chair of the panel was recused from the proceedings.

<< It is unclear why the word “also” prefixes this sentence. It seems to be an attempt to include this in the above argument that the panel was selected properly, but it has nothing to do with the initial selection of the panel. The statement is also vague and confusing. It does not seem to be a complete sentence so it’s meaning is unclear. It is true that Dr. Burton’s objection to one of the panel members was accepted. The first chair of the panel recused himself because the administration had lost faith in him and because Dr. Burton complained about his improper notice to the Platteville Journal that Chancellor Shields had already fired her (Peckham-defends-advertisement-5-17-17). 7777 The panel chair had also improperly communicated about the matter with a former employee whose husband, also a UW Platteville employee, had been accused of sexual harassment. The first panel chair stepped down citing that he no longer enjoyed full confidence of both parties (Peckham-resigns-5-17-17) 7777 . This was not true. Dr. Burton never had any confidence in the improperly formed committee or in it’s improperly appointed chair. There is a reason why policy was repeatedly violated in this matter. >>

Dr. Burton various alleged violations of open meetings law as it pertained to the hearings before the Panel. When these objections were made directly to the Panel, they were noted and overruled. Even if UW-Platteville was incorrect on this point, the appropriate remedy is for Burton to pursue an enforcement action pursuant to Wis. Stat. 19.97.

<< This is a misdirection in law. What this statement says, in essence, is that UW Platteville is not required to follow the law. Dr. Burton requested that the panel adhere to open meetings law before the start of the hearings (OpenHrgRqst-Additional-4-20-17).7777 4/20/17 also in (UWP state court exhibit filename: 577398 – page 18). The first chair attempted to provide notice but messed it up. The new chair failed to make any attempt to advertise any of the hearings even though she knew of the requirement to do so. IMPORTANT This matter is not on the shoulders of Dr. Burton to remedy pursuant to Wis. Stat. 19.97 but it is a violation of law that should cause the court to reverse the board’s decision.

The flawed argument that the administration can knowingly violate law and policy and that the targeted employee’s only recourse is to pursue enforcement action is prevalent in UW Platteville. The appropriate remedy is for the judge to reverse the board’s decision.

In a grievance hearing on Dec 2, 2013 a UW System employee stated “I do want to point out though that article Wisconsin 36.09 does begin with the statement that all of the decisions are ultimately the decision of the chancellor and the chancellor’s advisory, so basically the Provost and the Dean. So, Bottom line is that faculty governance is not a legal contract. That, in the end they can do whatever they choose to do. And that is the case. So it seems to me that arguing that these laws, which are not really laws, were broken is not real useful to us at this point. I think what’s more useful to us is to just look at: Was procedure violated, was there clarity in why procedure might have been violated, or, I shouldn’t say violated, was procedure followed and if there wasn’t a following of that procedure was there clarity provided in why that procedure was not followed? And then from there it’s up to whoever, to either go to the courts of law to make those decisions or to settle for what has been passed down. I think that’s where we are.” This statement is on an audio recording provided to the Board by the UW Platteville appeal hearing panel (USB data disk \Exhibit D\media\Media\A13 - 29-GrievanceMeeting-12-2-13.mp3 - at 54: 20 to 55:44). What this statement is saying, in essence, is that UW Platteville is not required to follow its own policies and procedures or laws. That’s another misdirection in law. Attorney Lattis was present at this hearing and did not correct the statement. Contrary to this statement Wis. Stat. 36.09(1)(f) states “The board shall delegate to each chancellor the necessary authority for the administration and operation of the institution within the policies and guidelines established by the board (emphasis added).”

Dr. Burton alleges that Chancellor Shields violated UWS 4.02(1) which requires the Chancellor to offer to discuss the matter informally with the faculty member. The Board rejects this argument. The record indicates that Dr. Shields did offer to meet with Dr. Burton but wanted his attorney present since she was asking to have her attorney present. Dr. Burton ultimately chose not to participate.

<< Of course the Board reject it. They are covering for Shields. Dr. Burton is not required to meet with the Chancellor so why is this even part of the decision? They make it seem like this is one of the reasons why Burton was fired. This is not a reason to fire someone. Burton was not required to meet the Chancellor. The requirement is that Chancellor Shields offer to meet informally, which he did not. He offered to meet formally. An attorney in the room makes the meeting “formal.” There is no requirement for Dr. Burton to meet with the Chancellor that she has accused of severe corruption, intimidation and unfair and illegal practices. (see rebuttal to statement of charges) The court gives great leeway for the agency’s discretion so this may be a difficult sell. >>

Dr. Burton claims that she was unable to force Dr. Roter to attend her hearing, and that this violates the adequate due process guarantees of UWS 4.05. She is incorrect.

<< Dr. Burton did not complain that she was unable to “force” Dr. Roter to attend the hearing. She asked for Roter to be a witness at the hearing and the administration failed to even ask Dr. Roter if she would provide testimony voluntarily. Dr. Roter’s contact information changed and the administration withheld the information from Dr. Burton. The record does not even indicate that Dr. Roter knew of the request for her appearance. It is reasonable that the investigator testify. In the Chris Henige case the investigator testified, so this constitutes unequal treatment under the law. The administration denied Dr. Burton’s reasonable request that the investigator testify without ever asking the investigator to testify. There is no indication that anyone ever asked Dr. Roter if she would testify. Dr. Roter did not respond to Burton’s email request and Attorney Lattis responded in her place. Even though she didn’t testify the Roter report was used as support for the Chancellor’s decision and for the panel’s decision and for the Board’s decision. They claim that the report was not used yet they all claim that their decisions were based on the report.

Neither the parties nor the panel (nor the Board for that matter) can compel witnesses to appear in the proceeding. << There is no indication that Dr. Roter refused to testify. If a witness refuses to be available for cross-examination his/her testimony must be struck from the record. This did not happen. The Board quoted from the Roter report extensively. >>

Nor is such a power commonly conferred in internal personnel proceedings. The issue of cross-examining Dr. Roter is moot. Dr. Roter did not testify at the hearing and the Board is not basing its decision in the Roter report.

<< What’s with this “power” thing? Burton merely wanted Roter to testify. She wanted verification of the Roter report’s authenticity so she would know who to blame for the fraudulent elements of the Roter report. As it stands, the report is fraudulent and Roter is to blame. It is reasonable that she should testify to clear up any inconsistencies in the report that has her name on it.

It is absurd to believe that the Roter report was not used in the decision making process when the Board, the Panel and the Chancellor all quote from it. This issue is not moot; it is central to the matter. The investigator’s report is fraudulent and is very likely a forgery. Cross-examining Dr. Roter could settle the question whether the report is merely fraudulent or whether it is also a forgery. A simple notary seal could settle this issue. Isn’t a tenured faculty member’s job worth getting a notary seal or at least a signature on a report? >>

Dr. Burton also complains that she was unable to cross-examine several of UW-

Platteville's witnesses. UWS 4.05(1)(e) does permit Burton the right to cross-examine adverse witnesses; however, she was unable to do because at the last minute she did not attend the first day of hearing.

<< The Marder Supreme court decision shows that the Board violated UWS 4 and Burton’s constitutional rights by conducting a hearing while Burton was not present. IMPORTANT

a. Dr. Burton became seriously ill the morning of the first hearing and was therefore unable to attend the hearing. She required surgery, and provided doctor’s notes to explain her illness (Bearse-Drs-Note-6-1-17),7777 (Bearse-note-6-30-17). 7777, (Bearse-letter-8-14-17). 7777

. This statement seems to imply that Dr. Burton just decided to skip the hearing for no good reason. The hearing panel chair stated “Good cause for a continuance of a trial or hearing is generally found where the facts presented demonstrate an unexpected emergency such as a sudden illness” (Appeal-DenialofReqst-5-15-17). 7777 So, Dr. Burton had a good reason not to attend the hearing. Her illness was also good cause for a continuance of the hearing, but the hearing was conducted in Dr. Burton’s absence, while she was too ill to attend.

The May 25, 2017 hearing was while Sabina was off-contract. She should not have been required to participate in any such hearings during her off contract time. >>

Moreover, other than Chancellor Shields, Burton made no attempt to recall any of UW-Platteville's witnesses for cross examination during the two additional days of hearing that were held.

<< This is completely false. Dr. Burton did attempt to recall the UW Platteville witnesses for cross examination but she was not given time to conduct the cross-examinations and was not allowed to conduct this cross-examination (Kasieta-emailtoLattis-9-14-17.pdf). 7777(Bob-Lattis-WitnessList-9-17-17). (Burton-Requests-Roter-Witness). (Kasieta-to-Hansen-10-20-17-RE-Roter). Dr. Burton was not given adequate time to cross-examine them. Other hearings for other schools have had hearings for weeks and deliberations for months. UW Platteville policy allows for the deliberations alone to take months (see UWP policy 6.3.12). But in this complex case entailing six years of retaliation the panel met only once to deliberate and quickly came to a recommendation. The brief time given for these hearings and deliberations indicate an effort to gloss over the facts of the case. It was a kangaroo court. See arguments in Burton’s letter to Kasieta on 10-24-17 - (AppealHrg-NoTiumeLimits).

There were not two additional days of hearings. Originally there were two days scheduled for 8 hours each. Burton was unable to attend the first hearing due to severe medical problems that were caused by the stress of knowing that the hearing would not be fair. The Board held a hearing in her absence in violation of her constitutional rights and in violation of UWS 4 (see Marder case). Burton was given only 6 hours of hearings, two of which were given to opposing counsel to make their case. So, in reality, Burton was given only four hours to present her case. She needed far more than that. The appeal process was merely a ceremony meant to present the false appearance of fairness.

Chancellor Shields lacked candor, and wasted Burton’s arbitrarily limited time for cross-examination or testimony (Transcript-hearing-9-19-17 – pg 36 ln2 – pg 43 ln19) . He even answered a question with a question.

Dr. Burton alleges collusion but presents no credible information supporting her suspicions. University officials receive the benefit of the doubt that they are acting with integrity unless the facts create an impermissibly high probability of actual bias. See Marder v. Board of Regents of the University of Wisconsin System, 2005 WI 159, para. 34. The Board does not see any evidence of bias or collusion.

<< The fact that Burton had complained about Shields shows that he was biased against her. It shows that he was not impartial. So, the Board is terribly wrong here. Shields is certainly biased, for many reasons and there is an overwhelmingly high probability of actual bias. But the Board considers this to be “permissible.” Evidence of the overwhelmingly high probability of bias is evidenced by the continued violations of law.

Chancellor Shields himself violated Burton’s rights repeatedly. He falsely accused Burton of talking about her complaints in class without any supporting evidence whatever. He very likely participated in forging the Roter report. He failed to give Burton the procedures for the Appeal as required. He gave her fake procedures by instructing her to deliver her request for appeal to the wrong person. That person, Dr. Anderson, ran the appeal even though she wasn't even on the appeals commission. Shields essentially hand-picked the hearing panel through Dr. Anderson. He got angry in the hearing of 9-19-17 where he said " if someone wants to come after me for something that happens on this university, as the Chancellor I'm accountable for all that." Chancellor makes it clear that he feels as though Dr. Burton is “coming after him” while he is doing everything he can to fire her. He said " Over the course of five or six months this had turned into an extraordinary circumstance. This university was pilloried, all kinds of things were said about us, on University Corruption, on social media, and all kinds of ways." He was criticized on universitycorruption.com and he clearly didn't like it. He was evasive, combative and lacked candor in that testimony. He answered a question with a question. He acted like his own career was the one on the line.

Burton had often criticized Chancellor Shields. The Board argues that Sabina called Shields a "liberal bastard" in their motion to dismiss the 2^nd federal case. Burton complained to the Board of Regents about Shields. She complained in her EEOC filings about Shields. Dr. Burton's repeated criticisms of Chancellor Shields makes him a biased adjudicator so due process was not provided for this reason as well as many others. Shields was not an impartial decision-maker. The risk of bias or prejudice was “intolerably high."

John MARDER, Plaintiff-Appellant-Cross-Respondent-Petitioner,† v. BOARD OF REGENTS OF the UNIVERSITY OF WISCONSIN SYSTEM, Defendant-Respondent-Cross-Appellant.

¶ 29 In explaining when the risk of actual bias is impermissibly high, Withrow held that administrative adjudicators retain a presumption of honesty and integrity and that, absent “a showing to the contrary, state administrators ‘are assumed to be men of conscience and intellectual discipline, capable of judging a particular controversy fairly on the basis of its own circumstances.’ ” Withrow, 421 U.S. at 55, 95 S.Ct. 1456 (citing United States v. Morgan, 313 U.S. 409, 421, 61 S.Ct. 999, 85 L.Ed. 1429 (1941)). In Withrow, the Supreme Court rejected the idea that because an adjudicating body had participated in the initiation and investigation of the administrative charges to suspend a physician's license, the physician's right to a fair and impartial decision-maker had been violated. See Withrow, 421 U.S. at 57, 95 S.Ct. 1456.

¶ 30 In concluding that there had been no showing of a biased decision-maker, the Supreme Court contrasted the circumstances of that case with cases “in which the adjudicator [had] a pecuniary interest in the outcome [or] in which he has been the target of abuse or criticism from the party before him.” Id. at 47, 95 S.Ct. 1456 (citations omitted). The court reasoned that mere exposure to the evidence presented in non-adversary investigative procedures was insufficient to impugn the fairness of the board members who later sat as adjudicators in an adversary hearing. Id. at 57, 95 S.Ct. 1456. The court based that conclusion on the reasoning that under those circumstances the risk of bias or prejudice was not “intolerably high or to raise a sufficiently great possibility that the adjudicators would be so psychologically wedded to their complaints that they would consciously or unconsciously avoid the appearance of having erred or changed position.” Id. Finally, in Withrow the Supreme Court placed the burden of making such a showing on the party challenging the impartiality of the adjudicator. Id. at 47, 95 S.Ct. 1456.” (emphasis added)

The Supreme court also wrote “The introduction of new and material information

by means of ex parte communications to the deciding official undermines the public employee's constitutional due process guarantee of notice (both of the charges and of the employer's evidence) and the opportunity to respond . . . . However, not every

ex parte communication is a procedural defect so substantial and so likely to cause prejudice that it undermines the due process guarantee and entitles the claimant to an entirely new administrative proceeding. Only ex parte communications that introduce new and material information to the deciding official will violate the due process guarantee of notice.”

Violations of policy and state, federal and constitutional law create an impermissibly high probability of actual bias (for examples of Shields’ violations of law and policy see (Rebuttals)). That the Board does not see this is evidence that their eyes were closed. The Board seems to consider these violations to be “permissible.” >>

8) Standard of proof <<Note: There are two paragraphs labeled “8)” in the decision order. Make a comment about this. >>

Under Wisconsin administrative law, if there is no rule stating otherwise, the required burden of proof in an administrative proceeding is that of other civil cases which is that the facts be established "to a reasonable certainty by the greater weight or clear preponderance of the evidence." Reinke v. Pers. Bd. 53 Wis. 2d 123 at 137 (1971). The Board has applied the "clear preponderance of the evidence" standard of proof in its most recent faculty termination cases and continues to apply that standard here.

<< There exists no definition for “clear preponderance of the evidence” in UWS 4. The hearing panel applied a standard of “clear and convincing” but the Board itself applied this vague “clear preponderance of the evidence” standard. According to UWS 4.03 the standing faculty committee “operate(s) as the hearing agent for the board pursuant to s. 227.46(4).” So, what is the standard of evidence? How can the Board use “clear preponderance of the evidence” as their standard when 1) the hearing panel used “clear and convincing evidence” as their standard and 2) there exists no definition for “clear preponderance of the evidence” in law? These are questions we should ask the Board’s legal “expert” in deposition.

They might have done this to cover themselves in the Henige case. From Henige: “The problem is that the standard stated in your case by the hearing panel was “clear and convincing evidence”, which is a higher standard than that required by the Regents’ argument. By holding the University to a higher standard, Sabina theoretically benefitted, so there’s no good argument for you. HOWEVER, one could argue that by stating that the standard was “clear and convincing” evidence, and because you knew they could not meet that standard, your case preparation was different than if you had been informed that the standard would be the lower “clear preponderance of the evidence”. Effectively, the Regents have lowered their standard of proof after they failed to meet the standard established by their own hearing agents, the hearing panel. Don’t get me wrong, I realize that the panel thought they met that standard, but you and I, and the Regents, both know they did not, and so now they’re trying to establish a lower standard in order to justify their action, which would be much harder to justify if the standard of proof were higher. Make sense? In fact, as I write this, it occurs to me that the Regents are arguing that their decision meets the “clear preponderance” standard, and you need to argue that the actual standard is higher (“clear and convincing”) and as such the Regents have not argued that the proper burden has been met. They should have argued that their agents held you to an even higher standard and Sabina was convicted on that higher standard. If they did not, then they’ve left the door open on this.

The unequal treatment argument is more mine than yours, because they held the University to a lower standard in my case than they did in Sabina’s. You are right, they have included this because I raised it in my petition for judicial review. They are trying to establish the “clear preponderance of the evidence” standard as the actual standard because it’s a lower standard than “clear and convincing”. But you must read Reinke. In that case the court first looked to see if there was a parallel offense that would provide them with a parallel standard in the statutes. In that case there was not, so that’s why they decided what they decided. In our case there is a clear parallel – UWS 7. Look at the parallel statutes regarding the standard of proof and you’ll see that like UWS 4, both chapters have two definitions, one for “preponderance” and one for “clear and convincing”. In UWS 7.05(8) they have determined that “clear and convincing” is the default, and that “preponderance” is the exception. The same exception exists in UWS 4.06(1)(am). What’s lacking in UWS 4 is the statement of the default standard, but a solid argument can be made that UWS 4 and UWS 7 are parallel statutes and that the same standard of “clear and convincing” must apply. That’s my point.

The other thing you have to ask yourself is why define “clear and convincing” in UWS 4.015 and then never reference it again anywhere in UWS 4? Because it’s the default standard and doesn’t require restating.” >>

8) Definition of "just cause" <<Note: There are two paragraphs labeled “8)” in the decision order. Make a comment about this. >>

Burton takes issue with the Board's use of the just cause definition in Safransky v.

Personnel Bd., 62 Wis. 2d 464 (1974). The Wisconsin courts have held neither that the Safransky case does not provide an adequate definition of just cause nor that a public employer's use of the definition is incorrect.

<< The main problem is that the board didn’t use the Safransky standard. They used a whack misinterpretation of it. In the first hearing Lattis told the hearing panel “The standard of dismissal that you will -- that the Board of Regents uses for termination of a tenured faculty member is whether that faculty member is engaged in behaviors that impair the efficient functioning of the university. That is the definition of just cause.” But that is not the definition of just cause. Atty Kasieta explained that this is a misinterpretation of just cause in the second hearing on 9-19-17 on pg 12-13.

The Safransky standard is not a standard for tenured faculty. It should not be allowed as a standard. Maybe after we win this the court will better define just cause.

“Respondents materially erred in Conclusion of Law- their convoluted language hides the fact that the Wisconsin courts have not upheld that the Safransky standard provides adequate definition of just cause for termination of a tenured faculty member. Respondents have consistently cited in previous cases a single line from the Safransky case, a line drawn out of context from an earlier case, Gudlin v. Civil Service Commission, (27 Wis. 2d 77 (1965)), representing only one of multiple tests for “just cause”, and does not reflect the full context of that earlier decision, nor the fact that the Safransky case requires more than one test.

Get arguments from Henige file. Here is the Henige filed petition (20180305-Petition). Here are other Henige docs: (Henige).

In Dr. Burton's initial brief, she argues that the standard set forth in Safransky should not apply in this case. In her reply brief she stated that her "conduct does not meet the Safransky standard, and she argues that the application of the standard is flawed as presented to the Board." She proposed that the Board should apply the just cause standard set forth in UW System's General Operations Policy, UPS Gen 14.

<< This is wrong. Dr. Burton pointed out that even classified staff under UPS Gen 14 have protections concerning the legitimacy of investigations. A tenured faculty member should have more protection than UPS Gen 14 provides yet Dr. Burton, a tenured faculty member doesn’t even rate a fair investigation. That’s the point Dr. Burton was trying to make. The board misconstrued her argument. >>

UPS Gen 14 applies, as made clear in the text itself, to the University Staff." (formerly known as classified staff). As stated in Safransky:

The court has previously defined the test for determining whether "just cause" exists for termination of a tenured municipal employee as follows:

. one appropriate question is whether some deficiency has been demonstrated which can reasonably be said to have a tendency to impair his performance of the duties of his position or the efficiency of the group with which he works... It must, however, also be true that conduct of a municipal employee, with tenure, in violation of important standards of good order can be so substantial, oft repeated, flagrant, or serious that his retention in service will undermine public confidence in the municipal service. "

215 N.W. 2d at 379, citing (State ex rel. Gudlin v. Civil Service Comm. (1965), 27 Wis.

<< This is misdirection in law. Citing one of the appropriate questions that helps determine just cause does not a definition make. This question is appropriate, but there are other appropriate questions that should have been asked by the hearing panel and by the Board of Regents but went un-asked. Burton contends that the Safransky standard does not apply to a tenured faculty member. She further contends that the Board did not evaluate her appeal using the Safransky standard but used a bastardized and truncated standard that they claim to be the Safransky standard. >>

ORDER

For the foregoing reasons, the Board of Regents orders that Dr. Sabina Burton be dismissed from her position as an associate professor in the UW-Platteville Department of

Criminal Justice, effective June 7, 2018, the date of this decision and order. This decision may be judicially reviewed by filing a petition for review in the appropriate circuit court, as specified in Wis. Stat. section 227.53(1)(a), Wis. Stats., within 30 days of the mailing of this order, which must name as a party respondent the Board of Regents of the University of Wisconsin System.

Office of the Board of Regents

Note: Lattis told the hearing panel (see transcripts) that it is rare to fire a tenured faculty member (9 in the past 20 years). In the past few years however, there have been Burton, Henige, Baica, Kung. (others?) This is an alarming cluster of firings of tenured faculty. These people have Lattis in common. Lattis has been using her position to influence the makeup of the university system to exclude anyone who 1) opposes corruption, 2) supports political beliefs not in line with hers, 3) advocates for student victims of sexual harassment. She has committed fraud and strong circumstantial evidence proves that she also committed forgery. She has committed felonies in this case. She has tried to insulate herself by getting others to do her lying for her but as the case came to the Regent’s level she became involved and committed obvious, provable felonies. She lied, she committed forgery, she committed fraud, etc. These things should pierce the attorney-client privilege she would otherwise enjoy. We should push for this to show the severe corruption. (find the case law that allows us to pierce this privilege.) We must show severe systemic corruption in order to force needed change. There needs to be a cleanup of the UW Legal department. It is up to us to force this change.

Charges against Marder were serious in comparison to the charges against Burton. Lattis continually points to the Marder case to show that Burton should be fired but her arguments are ridiculous.

Also use : Void for vagueness argument. The administration has been vague on everything.

(FishyReasons) - This is a compilation of case law. Use these cases to argue that the Board’s stated reasons for firing Sabina are pretextual and therefore discriminatory.

“We thus turn to the crux of the matter — whether there is sufficient evidence of pretext. Reeves, 530 U.S. at 143, 120 S.Ct. 2097. A plaintiff alleging a failure to promote can prove pretext by showing that he was better qualified, or by amassing circumstantial evidence that otherwise undermines the credibility of the employer's stated reasons. See Anderson, 406 F.3d at 269; Dennis v. Columbia Colleton Med. Ctr., Inc., 290 F.3d 639, 648-49 & n. 4 (4th Cir.2002).” https://openjurist.org/434/f3d/249/heiko-v-colombo-savings-bank-fsb

We have tons of circumstantial evidence to prove pretext. Use it in the framework of this argument.

“So the question is whether the proffered circumstantial evidence of discriminatory impact is sufficient to satisfy the McDonnell Douglas framework of proof. Murrell v. Ocean Mecca Motel, Inc., 262 F.3d 253, 257 (4th Cir.2001). See McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 93 S.Ct. 1817, 36 L.Ed.2d 668 (1973). Under this framework, the plaintiff must first establish a prima facie case of discrimination. Then the defendant must respond with evidence that it acted with a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason. Murrell, 262 F.3d at 257. If the defendant makes this showing, then the plaintiff must "present evidence to prove that the defendant's articulated reason was pretext for unlawful discrimination." Murrell, 262 F.3d at 257. "Although the evidentiary burdens shift back and forth under the McDonnell Douglas framework, `[t]he ultimate burden of persuading the trier of fact that the defendant intentionally discriminated against the plaintiff remains at all time with the plaintiff.'" Murrell, 262 F.3d at 257 (internal citation omitted).” https://www.leagle.com/decision/2005654406f3d2481630

We have tried to get the administration to commit to a specific reason to fire Sabina. They have tried to be as vague as possible, so they can later change their reason for the dismissal. We have however, been successful in forcing them to commit to specific reasons for the dismissal. They claim Sabina audio recorded confidential information and shared it with her husband. They claim that this violated an unwritten “standard of trust.” This rebuttal contains a trove of circumstantial evidence of discriminatory impact to satisfy the McDonnel Douglass framework of proof. Here is the argument broken into its component parts:

Prima facie case of discrimination: The Board fired Burton because she allegedly published confidential information. This is discriminatory because, among other reasons, other members of the UW System published the same audios/transcripts and were not disciplined.

Defendant responded with evidence that it acted with a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason: The Board’s attorney, Lattis, stated that Burton was the only employee of the UW System to have published the audios/transcripts. The Board wrote that it had no reason to believe Lattis lied. Still, she lied.

Plaintiff’s presentation of evidence proving that the defendant’s articulated reason was pretext for unlawful discrimination: Attorney Lattis lied. Several other members of the UW System published the very same audios and/or transcripts that Burton was fired for having published. The evidence is that the complaint and the statement of charges and the investigation report and the hearing panel’s report and the board’s record all contained the audios and/or transcripts – unredacted. There were about a dozen members of the UW System who published the same stuff Sabina was fired for having published. This proves that the defendant’s articulated reason was pretext for unlawful discrimination. There are also many other reasons why the articulated reason is pretext for unlawful discrimination (see above). The defendants gave up trying to use a legitimate reason and are hoping that Sabina will fail financially, that her health will fail her or that her attorneys will fail to make these sorts of arguments. The Board has no hope or expectation of winning this case in a fair hearing.

1. from (Faculty_Personnel_Policies-Procedures-2017) 6.3.13 Dismissals “All procedures for dismissal for cause are set forth in UWS 4. The standing committee charged with hearing dismissal cases mandated in UWS 4 shall be the Appeals Commission (see the Faculty Bylaws, Part II, Article III, Section 6). In a dismissal case, if the chancellor is advised that a faculty member should be suspended from his or her duties, pending the outcome of the case, he or she shall consult the Executive Committee of the Faculty Senate before taking such action (see also section 9.4).” (note; Fac Bylaws Pt II, Art III, Sec 9.4 does not seem to exist.) (Faculty Bylaws). - This shows that the hearing panel used the wrong policy for the hearings. They should not have used Platteville procedures.

2. UWS 4.04 UWS 4.04 Hearing. “If the faculty member requests a hearing within 20 days of notice of the statement of charges (25 days if notice is by first class mail and publication), such a hearing shall be held not later than 20 days after the request except that this time limit may be enlarged by mutual written consent of the parties, or by order of the hearing committee. The request for a hearing shall be addressed in writing to the chairperson of the standing faculty committee created under s. UWS 4.03.” - Dr. Burton requested the hearing within 20 days as required but the hearing committee never provided any notification of a decision to enlarge the time limit for the hearing. Dr. Burton did not consent to an enlargement of the time limit. She would have preferred to begin the hearing sessions in January or February or March or April of 2017 but the administration quietly pushed the hearing off until May 25, 2017 without explanation, or order, and in violation of this statute. Of course, the reason is because they wanted it to be held on a holiday weekend so nobody would come. They also didn’t advertise it.

3. Chancellor Shields told Dr. Burton to send her request for the hearing to the Faculty Senate, fake procedures. This violated UWS 4.02(2).

4. UWS 4.06(1)(f) “If the faculty hearing committee requests, the chancellor shall provide legal counsel after consulting with the committee concerning its wishes in this regard. The function of legal counsel shall be to advise the committee, consult with them on legal matters, and such other responsibilities as shall be determined by the committee within the provisions of the rules and procedures adopted by the faculty of the institution in establishing the standing faculty committee under s. UWS 4.03;” - Vaughan did not keep the panel within the rules and procedures. He allowed the panel to be selected by “volunteering.” He allowed the panel to hold a hearing without Burton in attendance.

a. So, the Faculty Bylaws are clearly the “rules and procedures adopted by the faculty of the institution in establishing the standing faculty committee under s. UWS 4.03.”

b. Faculty bylaws section 6 tells them the 9 member committee selects the five member panel. They didn’t do that.

5. The board’s brief said that the panel was selected within the procedures established by the university. Show this is not the case. The policy does not say that the Faculty Senate or the Chair of the Fac Sen appoints them. Let’s ask the university to produce the policy that says that the Fac Sen chair is given authority by the Faculty Senate to appoint the members of the appeal panel. They can’t.

6. Faculty Bylaws Section 6 states that the Appeals Commission ‘s responsibilities includes “Acts as an appeal body on the request of any faculty member against whom the Chancellor has filed charges that may lead to dismissal. In such circumstances, the commission shall act as a hearing agent for the Board of Regents pursuant to Section 227.12 Wis. Stat., and in accordance with all procedures set forth in UWS 4.” This is confusing because Sec 227.12 of Wis. Stat. talks about unrelated stuff. It is probably a typo. But this is another error in law that clouds the responsibilities of the hearing panel. (use the board’s words about ‘if we don’t follow things to the letter then it is meaningless’ – from Henige dismissal motion).

a. The Fac Bylaws also satisfy the requirement of UWS 4.03 to “provide a standing committee charged with hearing dismissal cases and making recommendations under this chapter.” It explains how it is done in Section 6. It is not how they did it. Not at all.

b. Also note: They allowed Dr. Burton to disqualify a member of the appeal panel. That requirement is in Bylaw section 6. So, why would they honor that requirement and not the selection requirement? Hmmm?

7. Attorney Brian Vaughan sent Sabina a bunch of procedures that he claimed were applicable but are not. I have the email.

[1] Only minutes before the first day of hearing, Dr. Burton's spouse arrived and announced that Dr. Burton would not be attending because she was ill. Because a medical excuse was not presented on May 25th, the Panel went forward with the case. Burton went to the clinic at 8 am when it opened. She was seen by a nurse and a doctor exactly at the time Mr. Burton drove to the university to inform the panel of the serious health situation and asked for the hearing to be postponed. It is an undue Burton and a violation of the ADA to demand a doctor’s note while or before Burton as seen by a doctor. Burton was scheduled for an endoscopic surgery to address her serious symptoms. Her serious health condition was confirmed in that procedure.

[2] The University did not allege that Dr. Burton technically violated open meetings or open records laws. Rather, that she violated reasonable expectations of professionalism and privacy by posting recordings related to personnel discussions regarding other faculty members. The university and the Board failed to acknowledge that Dr. Burton recorded the meetings as a whistleblower. Also, this “reasonable expectation of privacy” was never explained to Burton in any way prior to the event. It was not in the letter of direction and it was not policy or law. Burton did not publish the documents to the internet. There are many other reasons why this is discriminatory. See the rebuttal to Shields’ statement of charges for more info on this (sburtonstmtofchrgs-Rebuttal-3-30-17).